American Notes THE NAVY

After the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the cruiser U.S.S. Vincennes last July, a Pentagon investigation concluded that combat stress caused the ship's crew to mistake the civilian jetliner, carrying 290 passengers, for an Iranian fighter jet. Last week a panel of experts convened by the International Civil Aviation Organization reached a different verdict: the tragedy could have been averted if the American warship had been better prepared to communicate with commercial aircraft over the Persian Gulf.

The ICAO report stated that the Vincennes had no radio equipment capable of monitoring the channels used by civilian aircraft talking to the control tower at nearby Bandar Abbas. If it had, its crew could have heard Flight 655 get course and altitude instructions placing it near the ship. When the Vincennes became alarmed, it and the U.S.S. Sides sent seven vaguely worded warnings on an emergency military frequency that the airliner could not receive. They also sent four challenges on a civilian distress channel, but they were not specifically directed at any particular aircraft. Finally, the Sides sent a twelfth message that the plane's crew could not have mistaken as meant for anyone else -- if they had been listening to the emergency channel. Just 40 seconds later, the Vincennes opened fire.