Of War and Politics

By Bruce van Voorst William Crowe

Few people listened more closely to Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement of a unilateral cut of 500,000 in the Soviet armed forces than the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. On issues as disparate as the start negotiations and military involvement in the Persian Gulf, William Crowe (rhymes with how), 63, ultimately speaks for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines as the President's top uniformed adviser. TIME senior correspondent Bruce van Voorst talked with him in his Pentagon office.

Q. What are the military consequences of Gorbachev's proposal?

A. If he makes good on his promise, I would consider it a very welcome move. The reductions he's proposing do not redress the conventional balance in Europe, but removing tank divisions, cutting people and taking out some of the "offensive" systems like bridging equipment will change the military calculus. This could be significant, particularly in terms of warning time. Personally, I suspect he'll go through with it.

Q. Why did he go for a unilateral cut?

A. I see this in terms of Gorbachev's larger goals. He wants to improve the economic situation, and for this he needs time, stability and foreign capital.

Q. To become a greater threat to the West?

A. That depends. My instincts are that he cannot do the things that are necessary to genuinely improve the nation's economy and still have it remain an autocratic Communist society. He will have to decentralize authority, educate his citizenry more broadly; he's got to initiate data-processing systems and information networks throughout the country. He must increase international contacts. When you do that, you play with the guts of the system.

Q. Has Gorbachev seized the diplomatic initiative from the West?

A. There's always that danger. But in fact his unilateral action affirms the wisdom of what we've been doing. He appears to have decided that massive military investments do not give him a suitable return, because the West is determined not to be intimidated. We've said all along the Soviets have more military than they need. He's responding to our agenda. But we're dealing with a first-rate politician, and he's bound to harvest some political goodwill.

Q. You were host to Chief of Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev this summer and found him very congenial, but suddenly he's retired, and it is rumored he's at odds with Gorbachev.

A. Marshal Akhromeyev invited me to a reciprocal visit but cautioned that he might retire by then. He's 65, was wounded in the war and mentioned his health. I presume he'll remain a key military adviser. He's sent word that the General Staff looks forward to receiving me next summer as planned.

Q. But does he disagree with Gorbachev's unilateral troop reduction?

A. Instinctively, I don't think so. He's a strong supporter of Gorbachev's perestroika. In our talks he emphasized that for the arms process to be effective, both sides must make concessions. He is aware of the need to reduce asymmetries, but emphasized that both sides must take steps to ameliorate them. I can't imagine he took such vigorous exception to the Gorbachev proposal that he would resign over that.

Q. You know that other elements of the U.S. Government were not overjoyed at the Chairman "negotiating" with the Soviets.

A. I wasn't negotiating anything. But if better relations are to be achieved, the military should participate in and contribute to the process. If you say that only the State Department can talk to the Soviets, then, given the stakes, the multiplicity of contacts and the complexity of the issues, I must disagree. You know, senior military commanders deal all the time in diplomacy. The commanders in Europe and the Pacific go to country after country and are welcomed by heads of state and government officials and talk about a lot more than military affairs.

Q. It's widely said you are the most powerful military figure in U.S. peacetime history. Is this a fair judgment?

A. I'm an "adviser." The implication of your question is that I'm making all these decisions and directing everything. In fact, in our system, my military advice is rendered, but it is always only one element. I must defend my views; I don't get a free ride because of my office. There are a lot of disappointments, even for the Chairman.

Q. You seem to be much more than a military adviser. With your Princeton Ph.D. and negotiating experience, you're the classic "diplomat-warrior."

A. The No. 1 thing I took from my graduate education is that there are political dimensions to everything. Akhromeyev mentioned that he came to office without any political training. He suggested that my broad background must be helpful as Chairman. That was his perception, and he's right.

Q. Did the widespread criticism of the Persian Gulf reflagging operation distress you?

A. Not the opposition per se, but the shallow understanding of what we were trying to do. There were a lot more political merits than was widely understood by critics. In testifying before Congress, I found myself focusing more and more on the political ramifications. That wasn't my original intent. But -- and that's the whole point of this diplomat-warrior business -- there was no way to separate the political from the military.

There are no solely military solutions. So we need warriors who can operate in the policy world as well. It's the same within the military. We need broad- based fighters. We need managers too. The Pentagon spends huge sums developing and producing new weapons systems. That has to be done well. Our challenge is to develop leaders who can fight and manage and fighters who can contribute to policymaking. We have to develop a promotion system that recognizes all those talents. A man can be a first-class warrior, but if he can't function in the policy arena, that's a serious deficiency in higher commands.

Q. But the system doesn't recognize initiative.

A. That's not necessarily true. I am always looking for innovative people. In Viet Nam I was running the riverboat operation, and two kinds of people showed up. One asked for the tactical doctrine on how to operate those boats. When we said there wasn't any, he froze. That man was useless. Another type would say, "You mean nobody knows how to do this?", and "I know as much as anybody?" And when I said yes, he'd say, "Hot dog!" and go off and do it. That guy was great.

Q. How does an Oklahoma kid become a Navy admiral?

A. As a young kid I read a boy's book about Annapolis, and this triggered a lifetime fascination with the Navy. My father had been a Navy man -- radio operator on the battleship Pennsylvania in World War I -- and he thought going to the Naval Academy was great. Later, when Admiral ((Hyman)) Rickover made fun of my going to graduate school, I persisted. I recall Dad saying that if you run a ship aground in the Navy, that's the end, but if you get a Ph.D., they can't take it away.

Q. Has it harmed your Navy career to be so involved in diplomacy?

A. At one time I was slated to command a cruiser when Admiral ((JCS Chairman)) Tom Moorer asked me to serve on the team negotiating the end of the Micronesian Trust. I objected, but to no avail. I received a nice letter from ((chief of Naval Operations)) Admiral ((Elmo)) Zumwalt explaining that this was necessary because we have many naval officers who can command a cruiser but only a few who can participate effectively in international negotiations.

Q. Did that hurt?

A. I was devastated. It was nice to know Zumwalt thought well of me, but I was a captain at the time, and in losing the cruiser, I was convinced I'd never be an admiral. I figured my education had torpedoed my future.

Q. How else did you deal with this?

A. A sense of humor helped. That's what keeps me going in tough times. There's no situation that doesn't have its ludicrous side. Even failure. To understand that simple reality is probably the first sign of maturity. Besides, I'm a pessimist at heart. I never expected to be promoted, and it always surprised me. When nice things happen to me, it is quite exhilarating.

Q. An element of fatalism?

A. I think so. I've concluded that in Washington on all these decisions we deal with, it's never as bad as the critics say it's going to be. And never as good as the advocates expect. I agonized when the Bridgeton hit a mine in the Persian Gulf. Had I oversold our capabilities? I was in a blue funk. The Vincennes Airbus shootdown was painful for me. I had lived in fear of such a mistake. But once it occurs, I believe you have no choice but to face up to it -- publicly -- well aware that you'll be criticized no matter what you do.

I have learned that there's always a new dawn. I was shattered when I first ran into really world-class criticism. Then I discovered that if I hung in there, in a week or two nobody even mentioned all those bad things. Fortunately, there's a new newspaper on the doorstep every morning.

Q. Do you still refight the Viet Nam War?

A. I think about it a lot. That's true for all of us. I don't believe any decision is made today on force commitments without thinking of Viet Nam. It's not always said openly, but it's there. The trick is to decide when the Viet Nam example is truly applicable. There's a tendency to make the connection without really thinking through the analogy.

Q. Who are your heroes?

; A. General ((Robert E.)) Lee was great at recovering from his mistakes. The intriguing thing about war is how many mistakes are made. My conclusion from military history is that successful generals are wrong 95% of the time. For unsuccessful generals, it's 99%. In the fog of war, there's so much uncertainty. I am a strong admirer of Kemal Ataturk, because he achieved so much with so little. It's one thing for generals to win when they are backed by tremendous resources and production capability. But Ataturk with few resources wrested control of Turkey from the sultans and expelled the Greeks from his country. He's my candidate as the greatest military man of the century.

Q. How has battle changed?

A. The canvas has greatly expanded. It involves the whole globe, including the sea depths and a large chunk of space. Weaponry has expanded the scale of destructiveness. But the uncertainty of war has not disappeared, and the tendency for things to go wrong has increased. Battles are still fought by people, and their state of mind will still influence the outcome more than weapons.

Q. You're the senior adviser to the President and must at least ponder a decision to go nuclear. Could you push the button?

A. I believe so. I'll tell you, however, it's awfully hard to be hypothetical about this. I've played a few war games that involved limited nuclear attacks, and in that hypothetical climate, heavy pressures to stop using nuclear weapons developed on both sides very quickly. These were intellectual exercises. But they do suggest that our leaders understand the horrors of nuclear devastation, and will work hard to avoid it.

Q. Are you comfortable with your job?

A. I agonize a lot. I have known individuals who made a big decision and never gave it another thought. I don't. When it's a big issue, I don't sleep soundly. I remember Gordon Cooper falling asleep while in the capsule waiting for lift-off. Now that's real class. When he blasted off, his pulse went to 70. I can get mine to 90 just thinking about it.

Q. Can the U.S. have confidence in somebody who drinks bourbon and Coke?

A. Some would say no. People in Oklahoma would say yes.

Q. Do you really read the comics?

A. Religiously. I like Andy Capp. I used to be avid on Pogo and was sorry to see him go. That's not the only way I waste time. I watch sitcoms too. I really like Cheers. Probably the biggest plague of my life is all the time I waste. What I don't like is getting up early. In that respect, a Navy career has been tough on me. You know, the Russians do a lot of work at night -- at least Stalin did. So did Churchill. That life-style has an appeal for me.

Q. Where do you draw strength in time of trouble?

A. Primarily from my family. Former POW ((Admiral)) Jim Stockdale is a classmate and great friend. He said that when he was in prison camp in Viet Nam, one great source of strength was the Book of Job. Relating to Job, he could accept that life isn't fair. Many others couldn't and became bitter. There are things you can't do anything about when you're taking a buffeting. Something of this is applicable to being Chairman. You can't take the good part and ignore the rest. I find Job's experience useful in surviving in Washington. Harry Truman observed that if you want a loyal friend in Washington, you'd better buy a dog. My wife and I hedge our bets -- we own two dogs.

Q. A final word?

A. Just note that we talked for several hours, and I didn't mention defense appropriations.