America Abroad the Need for New Thinking

By Strobe Talbott

If a computer were to design the ideal President to deal with Mikhail Gorbachev, it might whir and buzz and come up with George Bush. As Ambassador to the United Nations, Bush got to know the folkways of the world forum where Gorbachev has been concentrating much of his genius for public diplomacy. As the U.S.'s man in China, Bush had a crash course in Communism and geopolitics. As director of Central Intelligence, he learned what KGB networks and Soviet missile warheads could do to the West on a bad day. As Vice President, he met as many General Secretaries as he helped bury (three).

Bush is genuinely fascinated by Soviet affairs. He has frequently held private weekend seminars with experts on the subject, and he chose card- carrying Kremlinologists for the top two jobs on the National Security Council staff. One of the first documents Bush signed as President was an order to the Executive Branch to reassess relations and recommend a strategy that looks ahead to the next century. The review is supposed to be an American answer to Gorbachev's "new thinking." Yet to meet that challenge, the study may have to work its way free of attitudes and assumptions that could make fresh initiatives difficult.

Part of the problem is that Bush's Administration came into office on probation in the eyes of the Republican hard right and wary of appearing susceptible to Gorbomania. Some members of the new team seem to relish the chance to sound tougher than their predecessors. A number of Bush aides have privately derided Ronald Reagan for his arm-in-arm stroll through Red Square with Gorbachev at their summit meeting last June and for proclaiming the Evil Empire a thing of the past.

Some of these advisers also seem convinced that what forced the Soviet Union to begin mending its aggressive, repressive ways was U.S. pressure of the past 40 years, so no change in U.S. policy is in order now. This line of argument underestimates the internal origins of Soviet reform. Gorbachev is not so much saying "uncle" to Uncle Sam as he is addressing the failures of the Leninist-Stalinist system. Moreover, he is doing so in a way that is earning him worldwide credit for being flexible and forward-looking, while the U.S. is in danger of appearing sluggish and uncertain.

Yet the Bush Administration seems eager to play down the importance of Gorbachev himself. It is only prudent, of course, to hedge against the possibility of Gorbachev's demise. But the Administration risks going too far in assuming, imprudently, that favorable trends in Soviet domestic and foreign policy are irreversible -- no matter who the General Secretary is -- and not far enough in taking advantage of the immediate opportunities that Gorbachev himself represents. For example, his willingness to trim Soviet military muscle might give the U.S. a welcome chance to rethink some of its own more expensive superweapons.

The Administration needs and deserves time to prepare its approach. The policy review is still a work in progress. But it would be a shame if it ended up being a rationalization for American old thinking and an all-purpose, platitudinous prescription for dealing not with Gorbachev but his successor.