Cuba Reading the Coca Leaves

By Jill Smolowe

Through two days of testimony, Major General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez sat with his head bowed, absently fingering his uniform, his downcast eyes glazed with an expression that suggested dejection or resignation. He neither smiled when the tribunal of 47 generals and admirals praised his past acts of military valor in places as far-flung as Angola and Ethiopia nor frowned when it branded him a traitor and called for his execution. When Ochoa finally rose to speak, he denied none of the charges: consorting with international drug dealers, illicitly trafficking in everything from cocaine and diamonds to ivory and sugar, shaming the Cuban revolution with acts of high treason. "I betrayed our country, and one pays for treason with one's life," Ochoa said. "If the death sentence comes, which of course could mean the firing squad, I promise you that my last thoughts will be of Fidel and this great revolution."

Thus ended the most sensational corruption scandal to hit Cuba since Fidel Castro seized power three decades ago. But the titillating proceeding raised more questions than it answered. On the one hand, the hearing seemed to signal Castro's determination to crack down on official corruption and take a leading role in stanching the tide of drugs that courses through Latin America and washes up on North American shores. On the other hand, the charges aired in the hearing made a mockery of Castro's repeated insistence that Cuba has an "unimpeachable record" when it comes to drugs. Despite solid evidence that drug-laden planes and boats have traversed Cuban waterways and airspace for years, the Drug Enforcement Administration and other U.S. agencies have no hard proof that the Cuban government ever sanctioned the illicit traffic. By nabbing such high-level comrades in the narcotics net, Castro could not help prompting such questions as whether -- and for how long -- he had turned a blind eye to the trafficking.

The corruption case unfolded with suspicious speed. Ochoa and six other military and Interior Ministry officials were arrested in early June. Ten days later, the Communist Party daily Granma gave a stunningly detailed account, , accusing the seven men of pocketing $3.4 million for helping Colombia's infamous Medellin cartel transport six tons of cocaine to Florida. By the time Ochoa's hearing was convened two weeks later with all the haste and splash of the ongoing scapegoat trials in China, it was a foregone conclusion that this popular and much decorated military officer would be found guilty. Ochoa's court-martial began last Friday, and all that remains now is the firing squad or an eleventh-hour display of leniency on Castro's part.

According to Granma, Ochoa initially tried his hand at money laundering for drug dealers based in Panama, but early last year found a more profitable line of work. Ochoa and an aide forged an alliance with Colonel Antonio de La Guardia, in charge of Cuba's program to circumvent the U.S.'s 29-year economic embargo. Because La Guardia, who was also arrested, was responsible for organizing blockade runners to transport computers and other goods out of the U.S., he had contacts with foreign businessmen and smugglers and had the authority to carry out secret operations. In May 1988 Ochoa's aide traveled to Medellin to meet with Pablo Escobar Gaviria, one of Colombia's most notorious drug barons. Escobar offered Ochoa & Co. $1,200 for every kilo the Cubans helped transport to the U.S. Over the next year, La Guardia arranged 15 successful operations, allowing the drugs to be dropped off either on Cuban land or in Cuban waters and then transferred to speedboats destined for Florida.

But why did Castro approve such a public spectacle? Was his target audience his Latin neighbors, the gringos to the north, or officers within Cuba's military ranks? There seem to be as many theories as there are analysts. Some speculated that the drug purge was designed to improve Castro's tarnished image with his Latin American neighbors, who have little patience for Cuba's Communist bent in an age of fledgling democracies. The move also distanced Cuba from the drug-tainted administration of Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama, with which Cuba has been known to have dealings.

Professor Enrique Baloyra of the University of Miami offered what he calls the "Havana-gate theory," that Castro turned the tables on his drug- trafficking cohorts in an attempt to mask his own involvement. By this account, Ochoa fell on his own sword to save the Jefe. Certainly Ochoa went out of his way during his half-hour confession to absolve Castro of any complicity. Those analysts who suspected that high-level Cuban officials were less innocent of the drug scheme than they let on pointed to one small irony: the tribunal included Admiral Aldo Santamaria Cuadrado, who in 1982 was one of four Cuban officials indicted in Miami for conspiring with a notorious Colombian drug smuggler. Because there is no extradition treaty between the U.S. and Cuba, the four men never stood trial.

Some State Department officials suggested that Castro seized the drug issue as a way to begin a rapprochement with Washington. Their projection was based on recent conciliatory remarks from Cuba hinting at a desire for better ties, and past overtures by Castro to cooperate on hijackings and immigration. Others at State were inclined to accept the explanation offered by Granma, that the Cuban government opened an investigation last April after rumors from friends and complaints from the U.S. suggested that the authorized operation to break the American embargo was being used to transport drugs. Many analysts think that Castro was genuinely outraged to learn of the drug running; the Cuban leader is known to be a moralist who hates drugs and corruption.

Those who believe that Ochoa's public humiliation was part of a politically inspired housecleaning were handed some potent ammunition last week: the firing of Cuba's Interior Minister, General Jose Abrantes, for the "great deficiency" of failing to uncover Ochoa's drug operation. It is possible that there are more firings to come. But an editorial signed by Castro stated that Abrantes was taking an inevitable rap for the corruption that transpired on his watch. In recent months the Interior Ministry has fallen into disfavor for not halting a sharp rise in crime and official corruption.

Few U.S. experts on Cuba embraced the possibility that Castro was foiling a coup attempt. But many did point to a restlessness in the military ranks: some officers feel they have not been properly compensated for their war duty in Angola and are believed to favor a glasnost-style easing of Cuba's repressive political atmosphere.

If Castro moved on Ochoa to send a message to the military, he could not have picked a better target. Enormously popular among the troops, Ochoa is a veteran of Castro's revolution who has commanded troops in Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua. In 1984 he received the Hero of the Cuban Republic medal, the military's highest honor. Last week Ochoa was removed as a full member of the Communist Party Central Committee and an elected delegate to the National Assembly. The move against Ochoa may have been personal as well as symbolic. His popularity may have threatened Defense Minister Raul Castro, who is expected to succeed his brother as the country's chief power broker.

Several U.S. cases have already implicated high-level Cubans in trafficking. In February 1988, for instance, 17 people were indicted in Miami on charges of smuggling drugs from South America, some of it through Cuba, into South Florida. Last March, when Reinaldo Ruiz, a Cuban-born U.S. citizen, and his son Ruben pleaded guilty, Dexter Lehtinen, the U.S. Attorney in Miami, released a videotape on which Ruben stated that the Ruiz operation had secured cooperation from Cuban officers to use military runways as transit points. Of Cuba's compensation, Ruben said, "The money went into Fidel's drawer" -- a charge that has not been substantiated. Lehtinen says that the names of some of those arrested in the Ochoa scandal turned up during the Ruiz investigation.

Castro's true motives for Ochoa's unceremonious ouster may eventually become clear. In the meantime, Cubans are watching Granma for the next twist, and the Bush Administration is proceeding with caution. Last week the President told the Miami Herald that Cuba would have to do "much more" to improve ties with the U.S. Meanwhile, there were reports that planes continue to smuggle drugs over Cuba, making a mockery of a recent pledge by Cuban officials to shoot down unauthorized planes violating its airspace on the grounds that they were probably carrying drugs.

With reporting by James Carney/Miami and Ricardo Chavira/Washington