China Advice from a Former President

In the past decade, Deng Xiaoping shed so many of his titles that Westerners came to refer to him simply as China's leader. Last week he retired from his final official party post -- the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, the party organ that oversees the armed forces and thus guaranteed him supreme power over the People's Republic. Deng's retirement, announced at the end of a secretive four-day party plenum that imposed a conservative agenda of economic retrenchment on the country, surprised Chinese and Westerners alike. Had Deng conceded political and economic momentum to the conservatives? Or was he merely playing a political game?

Since the Tiananmen crackdown in June, many China watchers had been convinced that Deng would retain his last post for a while longer to preserve his legacy of economic growth as well as to ensure the succession of his newly anointed heir, Jiang Zemin, a former Shanghai mayor who was named General Secretary in the chaos following the massacre. So far, however, Jiang has had little opportunity to prove his mettle. In fact, even though the Central Committee named Jiang to succeed Deng, it also expanded the powers of hard- line President Yang Shangkun, 82, a Jiang rival. Unlike Jiang, Yang has a national base and a large following in the army.

Other analysts argue that it is precisely because Jiang is weak that Deng has given up his powerful post. By promoting Jiang and then nurturing him from the sidelines, Deng may prevent rivals from ganging up on his protege as he learns to handle his new responsibilities.

Little more than a week before the latest title shuffle, Deng and other officials met with one of modern China's closest American friends, Richard Nixon. During the visit, the former President told his hosts that "many in the U.S. believe the crackdown was excessive and unjustified . . . and damaged the respect and confidence which most Americans previously had for the leaders of China." Nonetheless, Nixon feels strongly that the U.S. must rebuild its relations with China. Last week TIME obtained a copy of a report Nixon sent to a bipartisan group of congressional leaders. Some excerpts:

Sino-American relations are in the worst condition since before I went to China 17 years ago. One of the major reasons is that Americans and Chinese see the tragic events of June from totally different perspectives. The gap between us is totally unbridgeable. Every Chinese leader I talked to insisted that the suppression of the demonstrations was necessary and justified. They believe the American reaction was an unacceptable intrusion in their internal affairs.

On several occasions I referred to the use of excessive force as a tragedy. They refused to accept that; they insisted on calling it an "incident." In part, this may be because the Chinese word for tragedy implies that there must be a villain. As one close Chinese friend pointed out to me, no proud Chinese leader -- indeed, no national leader anywhere -- can ever admit that he is a villain. One top Chinese leader told me that any colleague who humiliated China in the world community by acting contrite did not deserve to be in office. Contrition may be an attractive characteristic in soap-opera stars, but not in leaders of great nations such as China.

Can the crisis be resolved?

Great as our differences are over what happened in Tiananmen Square, our differences were infinitely greater when we established relations in 1972 after 23 years of no communication whatever. But we recognized then that while we had irreconcilable differences, we had one overriding common interest that brought us together -- the need to develop a common policy to deter an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union that threatened us both. Today, when the conventional wisdom is that the Soviet threat has diminished and when many even proclaim that the cold war is over, do we still have a common interest that overrides our differences? And if not, what is the glue that can keep us together in the years ahead?

Does it matter to the U.S.?

-- Assuming that the cold war is over and that the Soviet Union is not a major threat to either of us -- a conclusion, incidentally, that every Chinese leader I met rejects -- we still have a strong strategic interest in restoring a good relationship with the P.R.C. President Bush will go head-to-head with Gorbachev in the Mediterranean on Dec. 2. Gorbachev is not a closet democrat, a philanthropist or a fool. His handshake will be warm, but based on his past record we can assume that he will have a card or two up his sleeve. We should never treat China as a card. But it would not serve our interests if Gorbachev were able to do so. Today the Chinese are talking to the Russians, and we are talking to the Russians. But we don't talk to each other. The suspension of high-level contacts has served its purpose in expressing our outrage at the crackdown. Now we must once again adopt a policy toward China that serves our geopolitical interests, and such a policy will require high-level contacts.

-- China is a nuclear power. Without Chinese cooperation, we cannot have an effective policy of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and will have no leverage at all in trying to prevent the sale of missiles and other destructive weapons to countries in trouble spots like the Middle East.

-- With Japan already an economic superpower with the capability of becoming a military and political superpower, a strong, stable China with close ties to the U.S. is essential to balance the power of Japan and the Soviet Union in East Asia.

-- China inevitably will become a major economic power, and its 1 billion people will provide a huge market for the advanced industrial countries. Do we want to rule ourselves out and leave that potential market to the Japanese and the Europeans?

-- Looking to the future, China, not because of Communism but in spite of it, will be an economic and military superpower. Do we want to run the risk of being an adversary rather than an ally of China in the next century?

-- How can we deal with global warming and other environmental issues without the cooperation of one-fifth of the people on earth?

Does it matter to the Chinese?

China has as big a stake as we have in restoring a cooperative Sino-American relationship.

Gorbachev's political reforms have received the headlines, but Deng's economic reforms have produced the goods. This does not mean that we approve of economic reform without political reform. But political reform without economic reform, no matter how popular it is in the short run, will fail in the long run. Economic reform without political reform will succeed in the short run, but will fail in the long run unless political reforms follow. If the Deng economic reforms, combined with his opening to the West, survive him, then the pressures for political reform will inevitably bring progress on that front as well.

All the leaders I met told me that Deng's economic reforms would continue and were irreversible. But now that he has announced his retirement, there will without question be a major battle for power between the reformers and the reactionaries who want to return China to the policies that existed before 1972. As I told Deng, "Everyone agrees that corruption and inflation must be rooted out. The question is, in rooting it out, do you also root out the delicate new growth of individual enterprise that under your leadership doubled the per capita income of the Chinese people between 1979 and 1989?"

The U.S. cannot and should not interfere with the choice that only the Chinese have a right to make. But if the U.S. continues a policy of isolating China, that will only be grist for the mill of the reactionaries. Contact and cooperation with all the major Western countries is essential if those who support Deng's reforms and his opening to the West are to prevail in the inevitable struggle for power.

What can be done to heal the rift?

China could consider efforts to resolve the dispute over Fang Lizhi ((the dissident who has been granted refuge in the U.S. embassy in Beijing)), to rescind martial law, to provide amnesty for those who engage in peaceful demonstrations, and to put out the welcome mat for tourists, students, scientists and businessmen who wish to invest in joint ventures that would improve the lot of great numbers of Chinese people.

The U.S. should consider the elimination of economic sanctions, the resumption of government assistance to those who want to invest in China, and the resumption of financing of major Chinese projects by the World Bank and other international lending organizations.

The stickiest question is who goes first. The answer is that if we are to go down the same road together, we must take steps together. On the final full day of my visit, I had a fascinating talk with the widow of Zhou Enlai. She is physically frail but mentally as tough as Margaret Thatcher. She takes the standard Chinese line that the U.S. and not China caused the present difficulties. She quotes the Chinese proverb, "He who ties a knot must untie it." If her husband had adopted that attitude in 1972, we would never have been able to agree to the Shanghai Communique ((in which both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of diplomatic relations)). Instead we decided to disagree on issues where our differences were irreconcilable and go forward together on the major issue that united us. We need a similar approach today.

The timing and choreography of the steps each side takes toward a restoration of our relations can only be agreed upon through private diplomacy at the highest level. For this and other reasons, the Administration should consider taking one step on its own now: the resumption of contacts between high-level Administration officials and Chinese officials. To leave the present and future leaders of China isolated, nurturing their resentments and even hatred of the U.S. because of what they consider to be unjustified actions against China, is senseless and counterproductive. The Great Wall of China is very thick. It is hard enough to be heard when you are inside the wall. It is impossible to be heard when you are outside.

Some hopeful notes

A very positive factor is that in our sometimes very tense discussions, not one of the Chinese leaders had a negative word to say about President Bush. They would sometimes blame the Congress, the media and the Voice of America, but never the President. Barbara and George Bush ((who served as chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing from 1974 to 1975)) are respected and warmly remembered in China as old friends.

Now that that sanctions bill has been reported out of committee with the Senate language virtually intact ((the measures would suspend trade assistance, freeze exports of satellites and certain nuclear material and halt risk insurance for firms doing business in China)), the President will probably conclude that he has no choice politically but to sign it. We can expect some negative fallout from the Chinese on the matter, but because of their bedrock respect for the President, I believe the further disruption in our relations, while unfortunate and unnecessary, will not be fatal.

Lashing out at hard-line Chinese leaders with further sanctions might make us feel better, but it will hurt millions of innocent Chinese people we are trying to help. The reactionaries in the Chinese leadership believe that China got along with very little contact with the West for centuries and that if necessary it can do so today. Rather than isolating China's leaders, this is the time to engage them in a constructive dialogue.