Is One Germany Better Than Two?

By WALTER ISAACSON

"I love Germany so much," wrote the French novelist Francois Mauriac, "that I am glad there are two of them." That phrase is cited with increasing frequency these days, but the sentiment is old. Clemenceau expressed it first as he wistfully reflected on the delicate balance of power nurtured in the 19th century by Austria's Prince Metternich. Since World War II the division of Germany has been central both to the tensions of the cold war and to the stability of the cold peace that accompanied it.

Throughout this period West Germany's allies paid facile allegiance to the goal of reunification, treating with abandon the fact that this simple dream involved some nightmarish complexities. It was an easy wish to proclaim, since it did not seem that the gods would ever grant it. Now, amid the widespread Western joy over last week's freedom dance at the Brandenburg Gate, comes a more sobering realization: the postwar division of both Germany and Europe seems to be tumbling toward the ash heap of history faster than preparations are being made for whatever new order might arise in its stead.

The two alliances that have divided Europe (and Germany) for 40 years seem less urgent militarily in the Gorbachev era. But they now must play a political role that is no less critical. At the beginning of 1989, way back when Hungary's Communist rulers were just considering whether to allow independent parties and Poland's were still debating whether to talk with Solidarity, the challenge seemed to be to find ways to ease Eastern Europe from the claws that had clutched it for four decades. In fact, Moscow seemed all too eager to remove those claws. So eleven amazing months later, amid the euphoria over headlines and live telecasts that continue to amaze, comes an added and even trickier challenge: steering Europe toward a continent free of rivalries -- with an unthreatening Germany in the middle and a secure U.S.S.R. on the edge.

The foundation of the old European order was the formal creation of two Germanys in 1949 and the decision by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer a few years later to tether West Germany to the Atlantic Alliance. For the Soviet Union, which subjugated East Germany as a satellite and buffer, this meant that any war with the West would occur on German rather than Russian soil. For the other Europeans, it meant a respite from the problem of German militarism. For the U.S., it made possible the creation of a strong NATO alliance to lead the struggle for containing the Soviets.

Enshrined in the constitution that established West Germany was the goal of reunification, but even conservative leaders there were privately saying as recently as six months ago that this was a theoretical aim, not an immediate one. In January East German leader Erich Honecker said he could envision the 100-mile barbed barrier around West Berlin that was the grotesque symbol of ) Germany's division remaining in place for another century. Few would have challenged that prediction.

Honecker was off by 99 years; the Wall lasted barely three weeks longer than he did. Likewise, the rigid repression of his Stalinist system is suddenly dissipating. So, at least on the surface, the question of reunification has become more real. Stripped of its walls and barbed wire, shorn of its oppressive ideology, lacking history or tradition, East Germany would seem to have little reason to exist as a separate state. The East German dilemma, says Henry Kissinger, is that "liberalization will undermine its reason for being."

Nevertheless, reunification of Germany into a giant that would overwhelm Europe the way it would dominate an Olympic Games is, at least in the immediate future, probably not likely and perhaps not wise. Beneath the surface, there are factors even within the Germanys that make a headlong rush to unity unlikely. Although 40 years may not be long enough to create the distinct cultural identity that distinguishes, say, Austrians or Swiss from their German brethren, East and West Germany have developed different values, styles and outlooks.

Even apart from their ideological systems, two separate sets of governmental institutions have been firmly embedded. Though most Germans chafe at the division imposed by the loss of a war, not everyone in the East wants to be subsumed into the Federal Republic and ruled from Bonn. At an extraordinary news conference (both for its candor and the fact that it took place at all), the East German Ambassador to Washington, Gerhard Herder, replied when asked if he saw a unified Germany, "In my dreams, yes, but being a politician and standing with both my feet on the earth, I don't see a possibility in the foreseeable future."

Significant moves toward unification would be difficult without the concurrence of the rest of Europe and, more formally, the consent of the former "occupying powers" (the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union), which technically still must approve changes in the structure of the two Germanys. Their support for the goal of a greater Germany will remain more rhetorical than real.

Neither neighbor nor ally is eager to see Germans achieve through an outbreak of peace the dominance they were spectacularly unable to win through two world wars. There was something moving about the unusual and spontaneous singing of the national anthem -- the third verse: "Unity and justice and freedom/ For the German Fatherland . . ." -- in the West German Bundestag when the announcement was made that the Wall was being opened. But it was also a bit chilling to those for whom the famous chords of the former Deutschland uber Alles are not so inspiring and for whom the dream of a united German fatherland more closely resembles a nightmare.

For some in the Atlantic Alliance, West Germany's urge to unify eastward raises the specter of neutralism, a concern heightened by the Gorbasms that occurred when the Soviet leader visited Bonn in June. For its partners in the twelve-member European Community, especially France, the economic threat of a united Germany is less worrisome than the possibility that Bonn will become preoccupied with pursuing its goals in Central Europe at the expense of strengthening unity within the E.C.

Eastern Europe also has cause for discomfort. West German leaders like to speak of their nation's historic ties to the region; to many Poles and Czechs and Hungarians, that is as perverse as it is true. A side benefit of the cold war was that it alleviated, at least for a generation or two, the fears that have existed ever since the Teutonic Knights roamed Eastern Europe in the 13th century, taking on the Balts and the Slavs.

The U.S. and its NATO allies can play an important role in encouraging closer ties between the two Germanys while avoiding the instability this could engender. The organization serves both to anchor Bonn to the West and to subsume its potential military might into a cooperative framework. In addition, the continued existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact provides a rationale for preserving two separate German states even as they converge. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's official policy calls for solving "the German Question" within the context of NATO and European economic integration. The Warsaw Pact and NATO also serve the purpose of defusing the nationalist rivalries that Europe has historically harbored.

As the revolutionary changes in the Warsaw Pact continue, NATO's role will inevitably become less military and more political. Far fewer troops will be needed, and significant mutual demobilizations in Europe will be possible if both sides agree. Already NATO's historic mission has changed: the threat of an invasion from the east involves sputtering Trabants rather than Soviet tanks.

The European Community is also a stabilizing influence because it is integrating Bonn's economy with that of its West European partners. "The events in Eastern Europe demand that there be an acceleration in the construction of the E.C.," says Jacques Delors, the former French Finance Minister who now heads the European Commission. The E.C. can help anchor the changes in Eastern Europe by granting economic assistance, trade concessions and eventually some form of associate membership.

The West's most immediate goal should be to encourage East Germany to follow the path of Hungary and Poland toward a freer economy and a more open political process. The outcome of such an evolution need not be reunification. For the time being, the comfort and security of all concerned could be served by having two German states exist side by side, working in harmony the way West Germans now do with Austrians or, for that matter, Canadians with Americans. Eventually, the web of economic and cultural ties could justify a form of confederation in which people and goods could move freely between two states that retain sovereignty. As the concept of national autonomy becomes blurred in a more unified Europe, the question becomes more semantic than real. Secretary of State James Baker has begun speaking of German "reconciliation" rather than reunification.

Ultimately, the future of Germany can be determined only by Germans themselves. Washington and Moscow will have a different opportunity as confrontation turns to cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe. The superpowers will want to negotiate the speed and terms of their withdrawal in a manner that enhances the stability that is in everyone's common interest.

Bush and Gorbachev will begin to address these questions at the Saltwater Summit. What can two men in a boat do when they put up their feet? Primarily, they will have the chance to assure each other that they both are eager to avoid crackdowns in East bloc states. The Club Med casualness will provide the perfect atmosphere to discuss the beneficial roles that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could play during a time of exciting but potentially dangerous transition.

When Gorbachev began waxing eloquent about a "common European home," he almost certainly did not anticipate the scenario that would unfold as the renovators plunged into the task. But unlike his predecessors, he may understand that the Soviet Union will be more secure with neighbors who tolerate free minds, free ideas, free speech, free markets and free movement. If handled properly, the revolution unfolding in one country after another opens up opportunities, unimaginable just a year ago, to create not just a new Europe but a new and far less menacing world order.

With reporting by James O. Jackson/Bonn and Christopher Ogden/Washington