In Search Of Vision

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

"The world is awaiting your signal. It is watching you. Do not let the world and us wait any longer."

-- Lech Walesa in Washington

The Polish Solidarity leader, and the world, may have to wait considerably longer for any clear signal about what kind of post-cold war Europe the U.S. envisions, and what it may do to help create one. The progressive dissolution of the onetime Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, symbolized by the opening of the Berlin Wall, raises the possibility of a historic turn toward peace and cooperation -- but also the danger of churning instability. So the questions are piling up: What can the West do to strengthen the democratic movements in Poland, Hungary and East Germany? What sort of relationship can be forged between the former Soviet satellites and the capitalist states of Western Europe? How can the pressure for German reunification be kept in constructive channels? Long range, what is the future of NATO in a Europe no longer frightened by the threat of Communist invasion?

These questions, of course, press on European capitals too. Yet the U.S., as leader of the Western alliance, has both the chance and the obligation to try to frame a coordinated policy. Alas, that calls for a vision of a new European order -- and "the vision thing" has never been George Bush's forte. So far, his Administration has shown no inclination to do anything except stand on the sidelines and cheer. Some Bush officials argue that it is all Washington needs to do.

It is always possible, especially with George Bush, that appearances are deceiving. Diplomats now talk openly of numerous private exchanges between the + U.S. and its allies about the developments in Eastern Europe. They note that Bush has a history of nurturing plans in secrecy and suddenly springing them, to the consternation of critics who had reproached him for indecision and timidity. The President did just that in presenting arms-reduction proposals to a NATO meeting last May and again in arranging his Malta summit with Mikhail Gorbachev, to be held Dec. 2-3. Says Kim Holmes, foreign policy and defense analyst at the Heritage Foundation, which Bush has asked for summit- planning recommendations: "When George Bush gets put up against the ropes politically, he usually pulls off something bold and successful."

Nonetheless, Administration officials confide that so far as they are aware, Bush is doing only tactical planning, concentrating on getting through the summit without a major substantive mistake or public relations flop. The President and his briefers seem to have invested far more time in considering how to counter a surprise Gorbachev proposal than in pondering what Europe -- and the U.S. role in it -- will be like ten years from now. Says one foreign policy official: "We've got plenty of philosophy and vision for 'a Europe whole and free' ((one of Bush's standard phrases)). What we don't have is practical ideas for building this new Europe. Do we use wood or cinder blocks? Where do we lay out the walls?" White House chief of staff John Sununu could think of no better way to counter criticism of the Administration's lack of a blueprint than to circulate anew to reporters a bound set of Bush speeches dating back to last spring -- "as if nothing had happened in Eastern Europe since then," snorts a Sununu critic in the Administration.

There are, to be sure, some good reasons for proceeding with care. For one thing, the process of democratic change in Eastern Europe has accelerated so quickly as to leave Washington -- and Paris and Bonn and London and Moscow -- flabbergasted. No one anticipated the opening of the Wall, at least on this schedule. Plans made one week may be outdated the next, and the first rule of conduct could be taken from the Hippocratic principle to do no harm. Bush is properly determined to give Moscow no excuse to crack down on the freedom movements in its former satellites. That rules out any gloating over the seeming collapse of Communism or anything that might look like an American attempt to exploit the liberalizing trend in such a way as to damage Soviet security interests.

* Further, the Administration is anxious to allay European fears that Bush and Gorbachev will make a deal over their heads to decide the Continent's future. There is a conviction that the Europeans themselves must take the lead in mapping a new order. For the moment, at least, this cautious strategy has won the approval of both European leaders and the American public. In a new poll for TIME/CNN by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, 51% of those questioned thought that Bush was "responding quickly enough to the recent changes in Eastern Europe," vs. 35% who judged the President "too cautious." Moreover, 73% said the Europeans should have more influence than the U.S. over these changes.

But if the U.S. leaves the thinking entirely to Europeans, it may find itself frozen not only out of the process but out of the Continent's future. French President Francois Mitterrand seized the initiative last week by inviting leaders of the twelve nations of the European Community to Paris for a Saturday summit. One priority is to resolve differences among the Europeans. France and West Germany want to speed up assistance and create special links to East Germany; Britain and others object on the ground that Hungary and Poland deserve more because they have gone further toward democratization. France and Italy also want to accelerate the economic integration of the Community as a means of cementing West Germany into the E.C. so firmly that it would not be tempted to break away in a process of unification with East Germany. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has been opposed to such ideas as the institution of a common European currency on the grounds that it would be an infringement on national sovereignty.

Broadly speaking, the Administration faces decisions in three areas:

Immediate help to the East. There is a budding consensus in the West to offer aid as a reward for democratization and as an inducement for more of it. West Germany, for example, has promised East Germany major (though unspecified) aid, on condition that it fulfills its pledges to hold free elections and move toward a market economy.

Well and good, but the question is how much aid, and from whom? Bush initially offered a mere $100 million to Poland. Congress last week upped that to $847 million for Poland and Hungary over a three-year period. While expressing gratitude, Walesa indicated that that was nowhere near enough. He likened Poland to a swimmer chained hand and foot, laboriously trying to reach | land: "On the shore, there is a cheering crowd of people who offer us their admiration instead of simply throwing a life belt."

But when one is drowning in red ink, it is hard to help others. Washington's inability to put up serious money to advance the cause of freedom is one of the baneful effects of America's deficits. Still, cash is not the only form of aid that can be useful. West Germany has announced a $2.4 billion package for Poland. Most of it consists of credits for projects that will benefit German business; the rest represents forgiveness of debt repayments on German loans to Poland.

Even more important, the East Europeans desperately need managerial training, along with capital investment and access to Western markets. In a recent interview with TIME, Hungarian reformer Imre Pozsgay said that his country wanted not "aid or assistance" but "an inflow of working capital." Hungarian Trade Minister Tamas Beck on a trip to Western Europe early this year presented a list of 53 Hungarian enterprises that are up for sale.

General Electric last week put up $150 million to buy a controlling interest in Tungsram, a Hungarian light-bulb producer, and announced plans to expand its activities. That is precisely the kind of help Eastern Europe needs. With some imagination and foresight, Washington should be able to encourage more links of this type. It could offer guarantees against expropriation and currency volatility. It could follow the West German example in offering loans that would ultimately also benefit U.S. exporters.

Defense. The U.S. military presence in Europe -- a major force for stability for nearly half a century -- could rapidly lose its relevance with the lessening of the Soviet threat. Washington has tried to defend the status quo by insisting that Soviet military spending was continuing to rise in spite of all the noise about perestroika. But last week a new estimate was leaked cautiously. It concludes that Moscow's defense outlays are somewhat lower than the Administration had expected.

Bush can expect to come under intense pressure on both sides of the Atlantic to withdraw some American forces. To an increasing number of critics, it makes no sense to spend $130 billion a year -- more than 40% of the defense budget -- on NATO, particularly to keep 330,000 American troops in a peaceful Europe. "With these ((East European)) reforms, we really have a genuine chance to get these numbers of troops down considerably," says Jurgen Ruhfus, West German Ambassador to the U.S.

Bush and his aides so far have tried to ignore such talk, lest they stoke a growing congressional move to whack the defense budget severely in the next few years. But last week Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ordered the Pentagon to study ways to make cuts of up to $180 billion in its unrealistically high spending projections for fiscal years 1992-94. That is an amount even greater than congressional economizers have been suggesting.

It is possible the Malta summit may force Bush's hand even sooner. The White House is bracing for Gorbachev to propose a deep mutual slash in Soviet and American forces in Europe. Initially, at least, Bush will reply by urging quick agreement on an earlier U.S. proposal that the Soviets cut their forces by 300,000 and the U.S. by 30,000, reducing them to rough equality at 300,000. Aides hint, however, that Bush just may have a proposal for deeper cuts up his sleeve to pull out if Gorbachev makes a dramatic bid.

Long-range integration. The former Soviet satellites eventually need to be brought into a general European system -- possibly along with the U.S.S.R., if it too continues to liberalize. Britain's Thatcher, for example, suggests that the East bloc nations could be given associate status in the European Community, like Austria and Turkey now. Something like that is sure to happen in due course, creating a megamarket of more than 400 million consumers. The U.S. could find itself on the sidelines as Europeans reap the economic benefits of the reconstruction of Eastern Europe.

U.S. strategists have been afraid that Gorbachev would put them on the spot at Malta by calling again for the dismantling of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But the Soviet leader, as worried by potential instability as anyone else, has said publicly -- and emphasized privately to the U.S., Britain and France -- that now was not the time for such talk. Still, the onrush of events in Eastern Europe could overtake both superpowers.

For 40 years the U.S. has railed against the Iron Curtain and spoken out for freedom in Eastern Europe. Now that those dreams are becoming a reality, Washington and its allies urgently need to define how the newly liberated states can fit into a new European order. Otherwise, the ruling vision will remain Gorbachev's vague but alluring "common European home" stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals." If George Bush continues to worry more about today's polls than about tomorrow's world, there might not be much room for the U.S. in such a Europe.

With reporting by William Mader/London and Christopher Ogden/Washington