A Rush to Sign New Accords

By William R. Doerner

The agreement between the Soviet Union and the U.S. that will allow 30,000 more American troops than Soviet ones to be stationed in Europe was announced last week in what has become standard fashion in the fast-moving Gorbachev era: a casual aside. During a discussion about German unification in Ottawa, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze interrupted himself, looked across the table at U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and said, "Oh, by the way." Shevardnadze then proceeded to report that Moscow had approved George Bush's plan that would permit the two superpowers to maintain 195,000 troops each in Europe's central zone and for the U.S. to station an additional 30,000 elsewhere on the Continent. Only four days earlier in Moscow, Baker had listened to Mikhail Gorbachev reject any proposal setting unequal European troop deployments. The turnaround was so complete, and so rapid, that top U.S. officials pronounced themselves "astonished."

The U.S. stuck to its guns on both principle and practicality. Establishing a manpower parity sends out the wrong message, Washington contends, since U.S. forces are in Europe by the invitation of host countries and Soviet troops are occupying forces. As a practical matter, additional American forces are needed because, instead of pulling back a relatively short distance across land as the Soviets will do, the U.S. will be withdrawing thousands of miles across an ocean. Any future troop buildup in Europe would thus require greater effort by Washington than by Moscow. Most U.S. analysts read the Soviet stand-down as one more sign that Gorbachev wants to reach a quick -- and successful -- end to the year-old Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations. "They are desperate for a CFE agreement," said a senior Administration official. "It's a matter of economic life or death." Some observers in the East speculated less charitably that the Soviet leader wanted to cut a troop deal to camouflage the impending eviction of Soviet forces from several Warsaw Pact nations.

As a result of recent progress not only on CFE but on other negotiating fronts as well, the superpowers may be on the brink of drafting several new arms treaties. Items:

CFE. Even before the issue of force levels was settled, U.S. and Soviet negotiators had reached agreement on the number of tanks each side would be permitted: 20,000. The treaty calls not merely for the withdrawal of both sides' tanks over and above that level but for their destruction -- 10,000 by the U.S. and 40,000 by the Soviets. Negotiators have narrowed, but not closed, the gap between the proposed ceilings on artillery; the U.S. has suggested a figure of 16,500 pieces, while the Soviets have weighed in with one of 20,000. Says a senior U.S. negotiator: "We believe we're really getting close."

The two sides, though, are still far apart on aircraft. The U.S. has proposed that its NATO allies be permitted to maintain on European soil up to 4,700 general combat planes and 500 interceptor craft. These 5,200 planes would represent a cutback of about 1,500 units. The Soviets, with as many as 10,000 more planes in the landmass east of the Urals than NATO, have offered a ceiling of about 8,700. That, says the U.S. negotiator, is a "total nonstarter." There is growing speculation that the U.S. will seek to exclude aircraft from the CFE table altogether. With or without plane ceilings, a finished CFE treaty could be ready as early as the end of 1990.

START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). On his trip to Moscow, Baker met with Shevardnadze to discuss three longtime sticking points in these eight- year-old negotiations and reached accord on two of them. They agreed not to deny each other certain missile test-fire data by encryption, or making it unintelligible, and decided how to count and handle missiles not yet deployed. The two sides are still at odds on how to define a weapons category known as ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles). The U.S. wants air-launched rockets to have a range of at least 930 miles or more before falling into the ALCM category, and the Soviets insist that the range of 370 miles or more has already been agreed upon. Predicts a top U.S. START negotiator: "We'll get over it." U.S. negotiators hope to wrap up START negotiations in Geneva in time for the scheduled June summit meeting between Bush and Gorbachev in the U.S.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS. The Soviets have revised their position on this subject as well, in effect responding affirmatively to a plan advanced by Bush in an address to the U.N. General Assembly last September. It envisions an eventual treaty signed by all producer nations banning the development, manufacture or use of such weapons and promising to destroy existing stocks. In the meantime, the U.S. and the Soviet Union plan to negotiate a treaty between themselves calling for the destruction of most of their chemical weapons. This agreement could also be ready in time for summit signing.

OPEN SKIES. Based on an Eisenhower-era proposal that Bush resurrected last May, the proposed agreement would allow unarmed aircraft from any NATO or Warsaw Pact country to overfly the other side's territory. The purpose is to observe military activity and installations. Detractors of the Open Skies concept point out that the agreement provides for a notification period of 16 hours, affording ample opportunity for the concealment of many kinds of mischief. But the proposal is viewed as a useful confidence-building device by all 23 nations involved. Negotiators hope to have a document ready for signing at a second foreign ministers' conference to be held May 12 in Budapest.

With reporting by Christopher Ogden with Baker