The Political Interest

By Michael Kramer

Statecraft is a modulator's art. "Sometimes you move publicly, sometimes privately. Sometimes quietly, sometimes at the top of your voice. And sometimes an active policy is best advanced by doing nothing until the right time -- or never."

Since James Baker said that on a Texas turkey shoot shortly before he became Secretary of State, the Bush Administration's conduct of foreign policy has been scathingly criticized. The common complaint, thrown out again last week by House majority leader Richard Gephardt, portrays George Bush as a visionless bystander in a changing world. It is a cheap critique that misses the point. As American primacy recedes, the trick is to maximize U.S. leverage by crafting creative techniques for disparate situations.

By this measure, Bush's foreign policy has got it right almost every time, the notable exception being China. The President's "don't gloat" response to communism's demise has exactly satisfied Mikhail Gorbachev's needs -- which at this time are also America's. So, too, the Administration's Middle East policy has been adroit. A combination of private pressure and thinly veiled public threats has pushed Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir so far into a corner that even he may finally have no alternative but to give peace a chance.

The Administration's German policy is the most nuanced of all. The Bush- Baker approach was reflected in their refusal to bash Helmut Kohl publicly for failing to declare the German-Polish border inviolate. As other Western leaders held press conferences to vent their spleen on the border issue, Washington urged privately that Kohl's coalition partners bear the burden of turning the Chancellor around, a result accomplished last week.

Bush and Baker have never worried that a resurgent Germany might actually demand the lands lost to Poland after World War II. What does concern them is , Kohl's survival. Their calculation is simple: Germany's continued economic, political and military integration into a unified Europe is essential for world peace. They fear that Kohl's opponents, the Social Democrats, might succumb to neutralism, with unforeseeable consequences as Germany flexes its considerable economic muscle in the coming effort to rebuild Eastern Europe.

Admittedly, the payback is yet to come; Kohl's chauvinistic propensity to go it alone has continued unabated. But by publicly ignoring the Chancellor's diplomatic free-lancing, Bush and Baker hope for greater influence down the road. Throwing America's weight around, they reason, could only make the transition to a Europe inevitably dominated by a united Germany even more difficult to manage. In another time, a similar posture was called appeasement. So far, at least, the Bush-Baker policy can be viewed as smart politics, as another effort -- to borrow Baker's words -- toward trying to get allies and opponents "to operate on America's terms, so that you can then do whatever you determine it is in your interests to do." Given the U.S.'s diminishing economic position relative to Japan and Germany, "on America's terms" may be too lofty an ambition. But it is always wise to pursue a smooth working relationship with your bankers.

How would Bush be maneuvering if he didn't have the cushion of an approval rating hovering around 80%? If the economy were on the skids and his popularity at 40%, would he revert to the tough-guy rhetoric that characterized his presidential campaign? Would he have resisted reading the riot act to Kohl? Would he risk alienating America's powerful Jewish lobby by playing hardball with Shamir? No doubt Bush will have tough moments somewhere along the line -- and then we will have an answer.