The Tortoise and the Hare

By JOHN KOHAN MOSCOW

So far, so good. Since the morning Saddam Hussein sent Iraqi troops storming into Kuwait, the Soviet Union has been cooperating with the West in opposing him. Moscow voted yes four times in the United Nations to condemn Iraq and impose stiff sanctions. Soviet diplomats have repeatedly urged Iraq to retreat and to free all hostages, while rebuffing pleas to ease their support for the international opposition. When the U.N. was debating the crucial fifth vote authorizing force to back up the sanctions, Gorbachev publicly told Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait or face further action from the U.N. Only a few hours later, the Soviets joined the U.S. in approving the historic resolution.

Probably no diplomatic change of heart during the gulf crisis has been as startling as Moscow's decision to join the international community against Iraq, the country that has long been the pivot for Soviet foreign policy in the gulf. But there are limits to Moscow's willingness to follow Washington's lead. Just because the Kremlin shares the American view that Iraq must withdraw its forces unconditionally from Kuwait does not mean the two superpowers see eye to eye on how to achieve that goal. While the Soviets do not intend to break ranks with the West, they have made it clear they want to proceed in their own way and at their own pace in dealing with Baghdad. Wary of a war, the Soviets want to give diplomacy and economic and political pressure time to work before any action is taken.

, Now that the initial emergency has been met, the Kremlin has been assessing its own interests in the complex situation. In effect, the U.S.S.R. wants to keep a foot in both camps, working with the international opposition -- and reaping the political goodwill and potential economic rewards of being a team player -- without cutting all ties to Iraq. Moscow could serve as a potential mediator, and the Soviets do not want to sacrifice all their independent influence in the region -- or see the U.S. become the only outside player -- once the crisis is over. As Vitali Naumkin, deputy director of Moscow's Institute of Oriental Studies, explains, "The Soviet Union has a different role to play. It still has a credit of trust with some regional powers that will not deal with the U.S."

The Kremlin's attempt to preserve its lines of communication with Baghdad has resulted in a diplomatic two-step. Moscow has resisted withdrawing its controversial contingent of military advisers from Iraq -- numbered at anywhere from 500 to 1,000 -- until their contracts expire, but has provided the Pentagon with information on Soviet military hardware there. After the Soviets voted to enforce the sanctions, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stressed that "we have no plans to use force or take part in such operations."

Moscow has pragmatic interests in staying slightly apart from the international pack baying at Saddam's heels. Economic ties with Baghdad have been a lucrative source of hard currency for the cash-strapped Soviet Union, and could continue to be in the future. There is also the unresolved question of the nearly 9,000 Soviet citizens still in Iraq, the largest national group trapped there from the West and East bloc countries.

Reservations are mounting in Moscow over the U.S. decision to send a large force into Saudi Arabia. The Soviets are concerned the military buildup could increase the chances of an armed conflict in a region already bristling with weapons. They particularly fear what a besieged Saddam might do if left without any face-saving form of retreat. For this reason, Moscow favors combining U.N. diplomacy with regional peace efforts, particularly Arab-led initiatives. Shevardnadze reminded Arab foreign ministers last week that their "ability to unite largely determines whether or not a war in the Middle East can be averted."

Already, some Soviet analysts say, the deployment of American soldiers to guard the holy places of Islam has stirred anti-American and anti-Western feelings among Muslims. Moscow frets that the crisis could ultimately widen the gap between North and South, pit the Islamic world against Europe and set the stage for future regional challenges that will prove beyond the control of either superpower.

Hawkish Soviet generals have begun to grumble that the massing of U.S. troops only 600 miles from the Soviet Union's restive southern border could be intended as a permanent foothold threatening to the U.S.S.R. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Belonogov told parliamentary deputies that the Soviet Union had been "notified" about the U.S. decision to field an expeditionary force but "did not approve." Said he: "We cannot be overjoyed at the stepping up of American military power in the region -- in the short term, because the situation is becoming more and more explosive; in the long term, because there is no guarantee that the U.S. will leave Saudi Arabia after the crisis is over."

Wistful speculation can be heard in Moscow about what the two superpowers might have accomplished together politically had Washington not opted to send in troops. As Gorbachev noted in an interview last week in the liberal Moscow News, it was wiser to pursue "collective approaches" than "extreme measures to enhance one's prestige." Like the fable of the tortoise and the hare, the Soviets are obviously betting that their slow and steady brand of diplomacy will ultimately pay off, especially if the first mad dash to contain Saddam should bog down in the sand.