Monday, Oct. 15, 1990
Arafat's Dangerous Ploy
After more than two decades of practice, Yasser Arafat has become an expert in the fine art of survival. Now the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization will once again have to use all his skills to find a way through the current crisis. By refusing to condemn Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, Arafat has infuriated many of his Arab backers, alienated Western powers that had only recently begun to warm to him, and driven Israeli doves into the camps of the hawks.
Arafat's most urgent problem is money. Despite their anger at the P.L.O., the Saudis, according to P.L.O. officials, have maintained their donations to the organization. But the exiled Kuwaiti government, which normally bankrolls Arafat for millions of dollars annually, has cut him off. More important, 400,000 Palestinians who worked in the gulf have lost their jobs since the crisis began, which means that they can no longer send money to their families in the West Bank and Gaza. To free up funds for the neediest in the occupied % territories, Arafat has ordered a 35% cutback in the P.L.O.'s more than $1 billion operating budget.
Arafat is also caught in a political squeeze. The gulf leaders refuse his calls, and he is unwelcome in their countries. In addition, the emerging Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian axis cuts him out of the locus of power. Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak feels personally betrayed by Arafat, and Syria's Hafez Assad has long disdained him.
The P.L.O. leader argues in his defense that his refusal to lambaste Saddam allows him to play a crucial role as a go-between. Arafat has regular communications with Saddam and has been in constant, if discreet, touch with some leaders in Riyadh through Saudi envoys. And despite the official break in the U.S.-P.L.O. dialogue last June, Arafat has kept up informal but regular contacts with the Bush Administration through back channels.
As Arafat sees it, he is covering his bets. Whether there is war or peace, he reckons, the Palestinian issue will have to be addressed. Moreover, if a peaceful solution is found in the gulf, he figures he will share the credit as a mediator. "I am sure some will reward us for helping avoid a catastrophe," says Arafat adviser Bassam Abu Sharif. That may be wishful thinking. The peace package Arafat is touting directly links Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait to Israel's surrender of the West Bank and Gaza -- an unacceptable proposition for the U.S. And in the unlikely event that the Palestinians negotiate a settlement with Israel in the foreseeable future, Arafat might still lose out because his reputation among Arab and Western leaders was irreparably damaged in 1990.
Arafat also faces internal threats. By tilting toward Baghdad, he has bolstered radicals within his organization who would like to depose him. Should Saddam emerge from the gulf crisis stronger, he might challenge Arafat's position. Some tensions surfaced shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait, when Saddam wanted to arm Palestinians there, but Arafat instructed them to decline. For Arafat, the task, as always, is to ride the tiger without being devoured by it.