Monday, Jan. 21, 1991

A Reluctant Go-Ahead

By Richard Lacayo

Never had Congress faced a challenge quite like it. In the Persian Gulf, 430,000 U.S. troops prepared to launch into battle against the Iraqi invaders of neighboring Kuwait. An American President had dispatched those troops to the Middle East, and the United Nations had authorized the use of force against the Iraqis unless they withdrew by Jan. 15. Yet Congress, the only branch of government with the constitutional power to declare war, had still not spoken, and the President was threatening to move with or without the lawmakers' approval. Last week, after the failure of the Geneva talks between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, Congress took up the question of war and peace with a rare sense of urgency. Said Speaker of the House Thomas Foley: "This is a matter of enormous moment."

Once the speeches were made and the votes were counted, a majority of the lawmakers had lined up behind the President and the battle that everyone had | hoped to avoid seemed closer than ever. The House, by a vote of 250 to 183, and the Senate, 52 to 47, adopted resolutions that, in language approved by the White House, authorized the President to use military force against Iraq after Jan. 15. Before the vote, Senate Republican leader Bob Dole summarized the paradoxical hope of the resolutions' supporters: "This is the best chance for peace."

Though the measures also required that the President first certify to Congress that sanctions were not working, supporters said the resolutions were tantamount -- but not identical -- to a declaration of war. Both houses also defeated alternative resolutions, sponsored by the Democratic leadership, calling for a delay in military action until sanctions had been given more time to work. In the Senate it lost 53 to 46 with 10 Democrats but just one Republican, Iowa's Charles Grassley, abandoning the party line. The House vote was 250-183.

At a press conference afterward, George Bush called the outcome in Congress "a clear signal that Iraq cannot scorn the Jan. 15 deadline." The votes also represented a tactical victory for Bush and a stunning turnaround of congressional sentiment. When the newly elected 102nd Congress assembled in Washington on Jan. 3, few lawmakers believed a majority could be found in either chamber favoring a quick resort to force. What seemed to be shaping up instead was a tug-of-war with the President over Congress's constitutional right to declare war. For months Bush had avoided seeking congressional approval of his gulf policies, fearing that a narrow victory -- or worse, a defeat -- would further embolden Saddam Hussein. But when it became apparent that the returning lawmakers were determined to open an early debate over his Persian Gulf policies, Bush relented. By early last week the White House was circulating a resolution seeking congressional approval for the use of military force.

The failure of the Geneva talks -- and particularly the impression of Iraqi intransigence -- made a confrontation seem all but inevitable and swept congressional fence-sitters into the President's camp. "If war is more likely, more people want to be behind the President," explained Indiana Congressman Lee Hamilton, an opponent of the Bush trot toward war.

Acting with a political deftness he has rarely shown on domestic issues, Bush skillfully worked Congress into his corner. With most Republicans already behind him, the President moved quickly after the Geneva breakdown to gain support from Democrats like Florida Congressman Dante Fascell, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He also sought the backing of longtime supporters of Israel in the House like New Jersey's Robert Torricelli and Stephen Solarz of New York, who became the strongest Democratic voice in the House in favor of war against Iraq.

Bush got help from another Democrat early in the week when Representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, painted a relatively rosy picture of a potential war. In a report he prepared based on public hearings and private conversations, Aspin estimated that in a war relying heavily on American air assaults, the U.S. stood a good chance of winning in less than a month. He figured casualties in such a conflict might be in the range of 3,000 to 5,000, with up to 1,000 dead.

Even as the President was trying to line up bipartisan support, the Democratic leadership was leading the fight to give sanctions more time. The antiwar factions in both houses fell in behind nearly identical resolutions drafted by two presidential hopefuls: House majority leader Richard Gephardt and Georgia Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Nunn, with his hard-line reputation on most other military issues, was particularly important for attracting wavering Democrats.

When the Senate opened debate on Thursday, majority leader George Mitchell laid out the antiwar, pro-sanctions position. Warned Mitchell: "The grave decision for war is being made prematurely." In the House, Gephardt stressed that the opponents of war were not friends of Iraq. "The only debate here in the Congress is over whether we slowly strangle Saddam with sanctions or immediately pursue a military solution," he insisted. "The choice is really over tactics." Robert Michel, the House G.O.P. leader, countered that those seeking to rein in the President's war power were creating a "brass choir of indecision, doubt and confusion."

While Congress debated, the White House continued to canvass for votes. On Thursday the President called in 17 Senators, including seven Democrats, to solicit their support. Next morning, more than 100 members of the House mushed through a snowstorm to a White House breakfast at which the President pleaded for their backing. Said Bush: "The last, best chance for Saddam Hussein to get the message is in your hands." To counter pro-sanctions arguments, CIA Director William Webster sent a letter to the Hill asserting that even if the embargo remained in place for six months to a year, it would not force Iraq from Kuwait.

In contrast to the President's aggressive lobbying, the Democratic leadership took a more hands-off approach toward rank-and-file Congressmen. House Speaker Tom Foley argued that arm-twisting was not the right way to influence colleagues on what he termed "a matter of conscience," but that deferential stance probably cost antiwar Democrats precious votes.

Even though Congress has now spoken, Saddam Hussein, no great student of the democratic process, may still conclude -- particularly from the relative closeness of the Senate vote -- that the U.S. is hopelessly divided and lacks the resolve to go to war. That would be a grave mistake. Armed with the U.N. resolution, congressional approval and his own strong conviction that Baghdad's aggression cannot go unanswered, Bush will almost surely unleash his forces soon if Iraq does not withdraw. But unless that conflict is short and successful, with relatively low casualties, the divisions in Congress and in U.S. public opinion will rapidly grow sharper -- and so will Bush's headaches.

With reporting by Hays Gorey and Nancy Traver/Washington