Israel in The Target Zone

By JON D. HULL/JERUSALEM.

Just after 10 p.m. local time, phones rang, beepers went off and dinner parties were interrupted by aides handing messages to senior Israeli officials. Secretary of State James Baker had just emerged from his meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva and announced that the talks had failed. That was good news to members of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's government, who dreaded a deal linking the gulf crisis with Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. But their sense of relief did not last long. Appearing before reporters about an hour later, Aziz was asked whether Iraq would respond to a U.S. attack by striking Israel. His chilling reply: "Yes, absolutely, yes."

Despite the Shamir government's efforts to maintain a low profile throughout the crisis, Saddam Hussein once again succeeded in yanking Israel back to center stage. Only this time, Israel responded by ending its game of hide-and- seek and adopting very public preparations for striking back. "Our pilots are in their cockpits," declared air-force commander Avihu Bin-Nun on state- owned television as he stood in front of a fully armed F-15 equipped with external fuel tanks for the more than 500-mile trip to Baghdad.

Aziz's words unnerved U.S. officials, who realize that Iraq's threats contain a brutal logic. If Saddam can strike even a limited blow against Israel, he may be able to recast the gulf conflict into an Arab-Israeli war, forcing some of Washington's Arab allies to abandon the coalition and perhaps even compelling Syria to switch sides. That gamble must have seemed all the more tempting last Wednesday, when President Hosni Mubarak was quoted as warning that Egypt would reassess its position if Israel became involved -- though he conceded later that "Israel has a right to defend itself."

Despite Iraq's rhetoric, its forces are incapable of dealing a devastating blow to Israel. Israeli fighter pilots should be able to shoot down most, if not all, incoming Iraqi jets before they reach the country's borders. Jerusalem calculates, however, that Baghdad would be able to fire 10 to 20 of its modified Scud B missiles before Israeli or U.S. warplanes destroyed the launching bases in western Iraq. And Israeli defense planners consider Iraq's Sukhoi-24 long-range bombers an even greater threat than the Scud B missiles, which are notoriously inaccurate. Iraq is believed to have 25 of the advanced Soviet-made warplanes, which can make the round trip to Tel Aviv without refueling and which boast terrain-hugging radar. If even a single SU-24 slips through Israel's defenses, it can deliver a seven-ton payload with pinpoint accuracy. By comparison, each stripped-down Scud can pack only 662 lbs. of conventional explosives or 331 lbs. of chemical weapons.

Aziz was careful to qualify his latest threat, vowing to strike Israel only if his nation is first attacked by the U.S.-led forces. His statement may have been disingenuous. If Saddam truly intends to embroil Jerusalem in the conflict, he'll have to use his weapons before they are destroyed on the ground by a massive U.S. air strike.

Eager to keep Israel on the sidelines, Washington has put intense pressure on Shamir to prevent him from launching either a pre-emptive or a retaliatory strike, holding out the prospect of increased economic and military aid as well as intelligence sharing. During a meeting with Shamir in Washington last month, President Bush pressed the point but failed to get a firm commitment. Says a senior U.S. official: "You never really know what the Israelis are going to do until they do it."

For now, Israel is unlikely to hit first, judging that the political fallout would outweigh the military benefits. If the U.S. detects that the Iraqis are fueling and preparing missiles aimed at Israel, a process that takes five to seven hours, it will probably try to destroy the launchers. But if Jerusalem detects signs of an Iraqi strike, Shamir may be impossible to restrain.

Washington has already volunteered to retaliate on behalf of Israel if it is attacked. Surprisingly, even a number of Israeli military experts, including former Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, have suggested that Israel should think twice before responding to an Iraqi assault if the damage is light. But Foreign Minister David Levy sternly rejected that advice last week. "Israel is not cannon fodder," he warned, and "cannot allow itself to be attacked without responding, just to preserve some coalition which is following the U.S."

As a matter of principle, any Israeli retaliation is certain to be far more punishing than the damage caused by an Iraqi attack. The degree will depend on the number of Israeli casualties and whether Iraq uses chemical weapons. If an Iraqi strike is largely symbolic, causing little or no damage, Jerusalem is expected to calibrate its response accordingly, hitting a few select targets, including the missile bases in western Iraq. Or it may acquiesce to pressure from Washington and let the U.S. do the job.

If Baghdad kills dozens of Israelis with conventional warheads or drops even a single chemical weapon on the Jewish state, Israeli leaders vow that the response will be devastating, even if Shamir has to defy Bush. Within hours, say military officials, dozens of key military installations in Iraq, including chemical, biological and nuclear facilities, would be in flames.

That task won't be so simple. Once Israeli jets head for Iraq, they must coordinate with U.S. forces or risk being misidentified as enemy planes when they head back from Iraq. But Israeli and American military sources deny speculation that a joint strategy exists, and complain that communications are dangerously inadequate. But Israel is reluctant to disclose its war strategy for fear that the Pentagon will attempt to veto its plans. And Washington refuses to provide greater access to U.S. electronic-surveillance intelligence, concerned that the information might encourage the Israelis to strike Iraq. Although Shamir and Bush talked twice by phone last week, Shamir says "more coordination" is necessary. Other Israeli officials privately warn of a potential disaster once the region's radar screens fill up with blips heading for Iraq.

Even a minor air war between Israel and Iraq would send shock waves throughout the Arab world, where public opinion instinctively backs any attack on Israel. But if Israel acts with restraint and in self-defense, U.S. officials believe they can hold together the delicate Arab alliance. A large- scale Israeli counterattack, however, could ignite a second war in the region. An Iraqi-Israeli battle, for example, would entail massive violations of Jordanian airspace, confronting King Hussein with a critical dilemma. Diplomatic sources say Jordan and Israel have held secret contacts to clarify their positions. Israeli officials, who are acutely aware that any confrontation with Jordan could prompt Syrian intervention, stress that Israel will strike Jordanian air defenses only if Israeli planes are first attacked by King Hussein's jets. For now, Israeli strategists assume that King Hussein will lie low. Given the sympathy for Iraq among Jordanians, that might not be easy.

None of these dangers have shaken the Israeli government's conviction that a military solution to the gulf crisis is far preferable to a diplomatic deal. As Israeli TV broadcast civil-defense advisories and the army ordered a partial mobilization of reservists last week, Shamir continued to sound upbeat about the prospects for battle. "If a war begins tomorrow and if it lasts just a few days, everybody will be happy," he said. Even under those circumstances, however, Shamir's joy may be short-lived: once the conflict with Iraq is settled, the U.S. is certain to increase pressure on Israel to work out a compromise with the Palestinians.

With reporting by Ron Ben-Yishai/Tel Aviv and Dan Goodgame/ Washington