Iran: The Not So Innocent Bystander

By Michael S. Serrill

When a high-level delegation from Iraq began meetings with Iranian officials in Tehran Jan. 8, the sessions attracted little notice. After all, at that same moment U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz were preparing to hold their last-minute talks in Geneva, and the clock was ticking toward war. But political analysts in Washington and the Middle East now believe a deal might have been struck at those meetings in the Iranian capital, a deal that last week triggered one of the more mysterious events of the gulf war: the sudden departure for Iran of the cream of the Iraqi air force.

The migration, which was suspected to total 100 planes, left allied officials perplexed. "It's tough for me to put any kind of interpretation on what's going on," said chief of allied operations General H. Norman < Schwarzkopf. If Saddam Hussein was behind the exodus -- and that was not absolutely certain -- his goal was obvious: to save his air force from being destroyed on Iraqi soil by allied bombers. But what had motivated Iran to give a helping hand to its erstwhile enemy?

No clear explanation came from Tehran. Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani did assure the U.S.-led coalition, however, that the decision to provide sanctuary to some of Saddam's most sophisticated French and Soviet fighters and most of his SU-24 Fencer bombers would not affect Iran's neutral status. The planes, Iranian officials said, will be impounded and held until hostilities end. They also insisted that no deal had been cut with Baghdad in advance.

Whether that is true or not, the decision to hold on to Saddam's planes allows Tehran to play each side against the other in the gulf conflict, to its own advantage. By facilitating the removal of some 10% of Iraq's planes from combat, Iran earns the gratitude of the U.S. and its allies. "These aircraft are capable of reaching Israel, and their absconding from Iraq greatly reduces Iraq's war potential," said Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens last week.

As for Saddam Hussein, Iran is giving him hope that should he outlast the U.N. coalition, he can still retain some of his military muscle. By helping out Saddam, Rafsanjani is assuaging the feelings of radical Islamic factions within Iran's parliament, who are unhappy to see Iran ignore the pummeling of fellow Muslims by Western forces.

In its public pronouncements, Iran has expressed only contempt for the goals of the U.S.-led coalition. Yet few diplomats, including top U.S. specialists, doubt that Tehran is determined to remain a bystander in the conflict. "I would be flabbergasted if Iran made a 180 degrees turn, violated the U.N. resolutions and sacrificed its neutrality," says a European envoy in Riyadh. Says a senior British diplomat in London: "Iran has nothing to gain by getting involved in the war against the allies. Among other things, its military is in terrible shape as a result of the Iran-Iraq war."

Anti-American rhetoric by Islamic extremists in Tehran is not to be taken seriously. "It is for domestic, anti-imperialist consumption that the so- called radicals shout warmongering slogans against the Americans," says an Iranian political scientist living in Paris. "Even the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are in no mood to join the hostilities."

% Iran has already gained a great deal by staying out of the conflict. Not long after Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2, Saddam, in a clear effort to keep Tehran neutral, announced that he would release Iranian prisoners of war and give up Iranian territory still held from the Iran-Iraq war. The gulf conflict also has given Rafsanjani an opening to repair relations with Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states, which supported Iraq in its war with Iran. According to a senior Saudi official, Tehran, as a reward for its neutrality, is asking for loans and a lifting of the quota limiting Iranian participation in the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca.

The most important advantage Iran hopes to gain is the opportunity to emerge as an influence broker in the postwar gulf. Until now, Tehran has been on the sidelines, frustrated at the prospect of being excluded from the horse trading that will take place after the war. Rafsanjani's immediate goal is to head off any possible moves by coalition members, particularly Turkey and Syria, to carve up Iraq after it is defeated. Iran fears that Turkey may claim Iraqi Kurdistan and its oil-rich areas of Mosul and Kirkuk, once part of the Ottoman empire, and that Syria may attempt its own land grab. Iran is eager to prevent -- by threats of force, if necessary -- any postwar breakup of Iraq that would upset the delicate balance of power in the region.

While trying to keep its neighbors in check, Iran has been quietly striving to win friends inside Iraq. Frequently accused of violating the trade embargo against Baghdad in the run-up to the war, Iran last week announced openly that it would be sending food and medicine to Iraqi noncombatants, as is permitted under U.N. guidelines. Both countries have Shi'ite Muslim majorities, though the Baathist government of Saddam Hussein is dominated by Sunni Muslims. Tehran's ultimate goal, some analysts say, is to foment a takeover by Baghdad's Shi'ites. If the day ever comes that friendly Shi'ites do control Iraq, Iran might offer the new government a generous gift: say, 100 or so fighters and bombers confiscated during the gulf war.

With reporting by Dean Fischer/Riyadh and Farah Nayeri/Paris