The Inside Story of Moscow's Quest For a Deal

By YEVGENI PRIMAKOV, ADVISER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

When Mikhail Gorbachev launched his own diplomatic offensive to resolve the Persian Gulf crisis last October, he asked his personal adviser, Yevgeni Primakov, to take on the task. Primakov, 61, was an ideal choice: as a correspondent for Pravda in the 1960s, he traveled extensively throughout the Middle East and met Saddam Hussein many times.

Primakov knew Saddam "possessed a firmness that often turned into cruelty, a strong will bordering on implacable stubbornness." But he believed that, given enough time and incentive, the Iraqi leader would have withdrawn from Kuwait without the allies going to war. Primakov, who took part in last week's meetings between Gorbachev and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, is writing a book about his diplomacy titled The War Which Might Not Have Been.

I returned from Baghdad the night of Feb. 13, where I was sent by Mikhail Gorbachev to meet with Saddam Hussein to try once again, this time while war was being waged, to turn him toward a political settlement. The road to Baghdad was not an easy one. The city was being bombed heavily by the U.S. Air Force and other members of the multinational coalition. In fact, according to the Iraqis, Baghdad was being subjected to particularly severe air attacks at the time we were there.

My conversation with Saddam was also not easy, and yet there was every reason for me to sum it up in a cable to Moscow this way: "There are certain promising signs." After our conversation on the night of Feb. 12, Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz told me about the decision of the Iraqi leadership to send him to the Soviet Union to continue the contacts. Three days later, on the eve of Aziz's arrival in Moscow, the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq issued its sensational statement, acknowledging for the first time its readiness to pull Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.

Thus it was no wonder the eyes of the world were focused on Moscow last Monday, Feb. 18, when President Gorbachev met for several hours with Aziz. Saadoun Hammadi, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, attended the meeting, as did Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh. I also took part.

President Gorbachev put forward a specific plan for a political resolution of the crisis. He suggested a formula providing for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait without preconditions and without the continuation of war. This time there was not the usual rhetoric from Aziz. He took the firm Soviet stand calmly, almost in a businesslike manner, showing no signs of displeasure. Aziz then returned to Baghdad to confer with Saddam. Three days later, on Thursday, Feb. 21, he flew back to Moscow with a reply. After another meeting between Aziz and Gorbachev, the U.S.S.R. emerged from the meeting with a fresh proposal that captured the world's attention. The Gorbachev plan, which incorporates an unconditional and complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, was accepted by Baghdad.

I realize full well that the Iraqi leadership is to blame for this war. But even so, I believe it could have been averted.

-- There Was an Alternative

The intensive way in which the U.N. Security Council adopted 12 resolutions in three months in connection with Iraq's take-over of Kuwait was emotionally / justified. But even at the time, it became clear that the process was yielding little of real substance. On the contrary, there was an escalation of Iraq's unlawful actions both against Kuwait and against representatives of other states. This was, perhaps, mostly a result of Saddam's psychological peculiarities. He may have thought he had a lot of time for maneuvering and should start from the harshest position possible.

The harsh economic sanctions and impressive show of military might, paradoxical as it may seem, created room for a diplomatic effort to find a peaceful way out of the dead-end situation Saddam had created. The first stage of the mediation effort was characterized by a desire to find a solution within an Arab framework. One approach was, and continues to be, to link the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait with steps toward a political settlement of the Palestinian problem. Saddam stressed this idea in his Aug. 12 speech, when he announced his readiness to discuss all problems at once: Kuwait, the removal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, and the withdrawal of the Syrians from Lebanon.

His offer was meant to harvest political and propaganda gains in the Arab world, where sympathy for Iraq, as the only real fighter for a solution to the Palestinian problem, was growing. It must be said quite bluntly that among the Arab masses, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait might have been considered a justifiable price for resolving the Palestinian problem. This aspect seems to have gone unnoticed by Washington and by leaders in certain other Western capitals, where the broad support of the Arab masses for Saddam is underestimated.

The chances of adopting Saddam's formula for achieving a political settlement of the Kuwait crisis were practically nil. Yet a two-pronged option remained open: Why not try to make use of the Arabs' interest in resolving the Palestinian problem to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait? And at the same time, why not take a chance on using the political settlement of the crisis as an impetus for bringing about a solution of another major security issue in the region, the Arab-Israeli problem?

-- Rendezvous in Helsinki

When George Bush invited Gorbachev to meet with him in Helsinki on Sept. 9, the prevailing opinion in Moscow, let's be frank, was that things would not end in war. It was thought something would come out of using the arsenal of political and economic sanctions and a military show of force.

^ On the eve of his meeting with Bush, Gorbachev talked with his advisers until well after midnight. He once again focused on stepping up efforts to resolve the Palestinian problem in order to get Iraq out of Kuwait. In other words, we should ensure that Saddam's withdrawal was unconditional but also state definitively that such a move would open the way for a more active search for a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was not a question of adopting Saddam's plan of Aug. 12, in which he specifically linked an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories to an Iraqi departure from Kuwait. On the other hand, if the U.S. had agreed to our approach to the problem and had been able to talk Israel into agreeing to it, Saddam would not have been able to play the Palestinian card.

Gorbachev was accompanied to Helsinki by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, his chief military adviser. Akhromeyev warned the Americans that military action would result in colossal destruction and human casualties. He also warned that the war could not be brought to an end by air strikes alone and that the Iraqis were not afraid of losses on their side.

During their conversation, Gorbachev and Bush emphasized avoiding an armed clash in the Persian Gulf. This possibility could not absolutely be ruled out, since a great deal -- some considered everything -- depended on Saddam. But Gorbachev told me afterward that he had concluded that the U.S. President intended to solve the Kuwait problem through political methods.

In an effort to strengthen Bush's will, Gorbachev told him that the dispatch of armed forces to the gulf and the active policy of the Security Council had already resolved a number of strategic tasks: armed action had not spread to other countries of the Arabian Peninsula, and an oil crisis, which had threatened the world economy as a result of both Kuwait's and Iraq's suspension of oil exports, had been averted. Gorbachev also pointed out that the stand against aggression had received international support. Now what was needed was additional diplomatic efforts.

-- Saddam Hussein and Me

My long-standing acquaintanceship with Saddam was no secret. I first met him in 1969, when I was working as a Pravda correspondent in the Middle East. At that time, he was not yet the President, but he had already become one of the most influential members in the Iraqi leadership. I also became closely acquainted with Aziz, who then served as editor in chief of Ath-Thawra, the main newspaper of the Baath Party.

Those were unstable times. The wing of the Baath Party in which Saddam and Aziz were members had just come to power. In the offices of both men there were submachine guns. Even at that stage, many features of Saddam's character were clearly evident, features that were preserved and developed further when he became the leader of Iraq. He possessed a firmness that often turned into cruelty, a strong will bordering on implacable stubbornness, a readiness to go charging toward his goal, regardless of obstacles and the price, and an overblown understanding of such concepts as honor and dignity. Saddam was quite rational, but he had a penchant for making unexpected about-turns.

I met with Saddam many times, when he visited Moscow and during my missions to Baghdad. Our relationship developed in such a way that I could talk with him without all the diplomatic niceties. Saddam accepted such a style of conversation, and it seemed to me that he liked it that way.

My ties to Saddam were taken into account when President Gorbachev instructed me in early October to go to Baghdad as his personal representative to help resolve the Kuwait crisis. I was accompanied by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, Igor Belousov. We had two objectives: to reach an agreement to allow our 7,830 military and industrial specialists based in Iraq to leave, and to show Saddam the total hopelessness of refusing to abide by the Security Council's demands. We also wanted to look for a way to bring about the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait by diplomatic means.

Aziz met us at the airport. I talked with him for several hours, and the session was probably the toughest I've ever had with an Iraqi official. He focused entirely on trying to prove that Kuwait belonged to Iraq from the point of view of history, politics and economics. He spoke about how certain other Arab states "purposefully," as Aziz emphasized, made Iraq act the way it did. I thought to myself how Aziz, arriving in Moscow in 1980 a few days after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, had tried to prove to me that it was not Iraq but Iran that had started the fighting.

In Aziz's monologue one could easily hear the sharp note of displeasure and dissatisfaction with the policy of the Soviet Union, which "should have acted in a different way, considering its treaty with Iraq." But when we asked Aziz why Iraq had not notified Moscow before it intervened in Kuwait, he sidestepped the question. !

The talk with Saddam took place in the Presidential Palace on Oct. 5. Deeply engrossed in the written message from President Gorbachev, Saddam did not react directly to the fairly strong phrases in it about the need to get immediately out of Kuwait and to restore the sovereignty of that state. But the atmosphere at the beginning of the talk was tense.

After Saddam repeated everything about Kuwait that we had heard earlier from Aziz, Belousov and I raised the question about our specialists. He responded instantly and definitely: All who wished could leave, but in the next two months the quota would be limited to 1,000, so as not to hamper work or halt the projects.

"We must not agree with that," Belousov said quietly.

Knowing that our embassy had received approximately 1,500 applications to get out of the country, I suggested drawing up a schedule for the departure of 1,500 specialists a month.

"Let it be your way," Saddam finally agreed.

Then the subject changed. Saddam contended that as soon as Iraq had scored a military success over Iran in 1988, it became the target of a "multilateral conspiracy." Neither the U.S. nor Israel, Saddam said, could allow the existence of an Iraq with "beefed-up military muscles." Saddam contended that Saudi Arabia and certain emirates in the gulf were involved in this "conspiracy." Economic pressure had come into play, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates violating the oil-export quotas that had been set down by OPEC. The price of oil had dropped from $21 to $11 per bbl., which, he said, "spelled economic ruin" for Iraq.

I shall not go into the essence of his charges -- something in all this may have corresponded to the truth; something was a figment of his imagination, the result of overwrought suspicions. But that is what he really believed.

"Doesn't it seem to you that just like the Israelis, you have a Masada complex?" I asked Saddam. He nodded his head.

"But then your actions will to a great extent be determined by the logic of a doomed man?" I asked.

It seemed to me that Saddam also agreed with this, but he said nothing in reply.

Then we switched to a discussion of the possible consequences of refusing to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the world's reaction to the Kuwait crisis. I especially wanted to bring up these two subjects, since I realized that it was possible Saddam did not have complete information. He gave priority to ( positive reports: for example, about the support Iraq was receiving in the Arab world, about the antiwar demonstrations in the West, about the first hints of differences between the allies in the anti-Iraqi coalition. And as for bad news, the bearer could pay a high price.

"If you do not remove your forces from Kuwait, you will inevitably become the target of an attack," I told him. "You must have some sense of responsibility for the war that will come down on the region. Of course, you realize that the purpose of my mission here is not intimidation. But perhaps there is no way out of the situation other than the pullout of Iraqi forces."

Saddam's response was mixed. He said, in the event of a military option, he would employ all the means at his disposal and would undoubtedly spread the flames of war to other countries, especially Israel. If I have to fall to my knees and surrender or fight, Saddam said, I will choose the latter.

At the same time, Saddam noted -- and here I would like to convey what was said with almost a stenographer's accuracy -- the following: "As a realist I understand the true state of affairs. Yet I cannot resolve the question of Kuwait if it is not tied up with the solution to other problems of the region. I have already expressed this idea on Aug. 12. However, I want to make one thing clear ((and here Saddam was stepping back somewhat from his Aug. 12 statement)). The time linkage and the process leading to a solution of the Palestinian problem are to be discussed at negotiations."

-- We Devise a Plan

After returning to Moscow on the evening of Oct. 6, I informed President Gorbachev in detail about the meetings in Baghdad. Once he heard my oral report, he told us to draw up proposals, hoping to continue the peace mission. I submitted my ideas on Oct. 8.

The whole plan hinged on finding the dividing line between "rewarding" aggression and "saving face" for Saddam. This would be the price for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and for avoiding the military option, with all its dangerous consequences.

This is how we thought it might happen. Iraq had to pledge that it would pull out its forces from Kuwait and then carry out the withdrawal. But Saddam would also know that once his troops had pulled out, a process would start that would lead to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The members of the Security Council would actively participate in this process.

Another problem we could not bypass was the territorial and economic disputes between Iraq and Kuwait. Once again, according to our proposals, Saddam would know ahead of time that talks with the Kuwaiti leadership about these disputes would be organized within an Arab framework -- but only after the withdrawal of Iraq's forces from the entire territory that was under Kuwait's sovereignty until Aug. 2.

Serious thought also had to be given to a regional security system. On the one hand, Iraq's neighbors were apprehensive, and not without reason, because its aggressive behavior in the past few years was based on a rapidly growing military potential. On the other hand, Saddam himself was anxious, since he was sure that he would remain in the "gunsights" even if Iraqi troops were pulled out of Kuwait.

It became absolutely clear that one of the main elements of such a security system had to be a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Without such a settlement, it would be impossible even to define the borders of the neighboring countries, to say nothing of ensuring their safety.

To sum up, our proposed approach was to guarantee the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by political means. This would be done by convincing Saddam that following his withdrawal, but not in "linkage" -- I want to stress this -- certain steps would be taken that promoted a settlement of regional disputes and stabilized the situation in the Middle East.

-- At the White House

I arrived in Washington on Oct. 18 to discuss my plan with U.S. officials. It was easy to see the genuine interest of the Americans in these meetings. The heightened interest in exchanging views with me might have been due to the fact that since the beginning of the gulf conflict, Washington had not had any direct contacts with Saddam. It seemed to me that they got their information about the situation mainly from their allies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

I met first with Secretary of State James Baker. Also taking part was Dennis Ross, director of the policy-planning staff and the State Department's chief expert on the Middle East. What was immediately evident to us was that while taking an interest in the details, Ross listened to my explanation in a reserved way, if not to say quite negatively. The main idea -- making Iraq understand that once troops were withdrawn, we would be ready to discuss the Arab-Israeli issue in order to resolve the Palestinian problem -- drew a decidedly negative response.

"Israel won't go for that," Ross curtly said.

Ross also voiced skepticism about drawing a line between "rewarding" Saddam and "saving face" for him, which we considered necessary to ensure Iraq's exit from Kuwait.

There was little that was new in my next meeting, with National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and his deputy, Robert Gates. Scowcroft was more interested in our perceptions of the situation in Iraq than in the proposals for getting out of the crisis. The meeting became lively after the unexpected arrival of President Bush. He had made a dash through the pouring rain from his private residence, just to drop by for a minute, all soaking wet, to shake our hands.

"I had to come by, knowing you were here with Scowcroft," he declared. This human side of Bush really makes you like him. "I'm looking forward to our meeting tomorrow morning," he told us as he left.

On the morning of Oct. 19, we were received in the White House by the President. Also present were Baker, Scowcroft, head of the White House staff John Sununu, and other close aides of the President. Bush asked whether it was really possible to interpret Saddam's contention that he was a "realist" as a sign of his readiness to get out of Kuwait. The President displayed a keen interest in the psychological characteristics of Saddam and in the history of my relations with him. Bush asked many specific questions, and he took notes. It was obvious that some of my observations and judgments did not coincide with the point of view of the President. For example, he was very doubtful that there was growing support for Saddam in the Arab world.

On the whole, it seemed that Bush was still hesitating whether or not to make the final decision for a military strike against Iraq. He did not rule out and actually spoke in favor of our holding a second meeting with Saddam. But he stressed that it must have a limited focus: "to inform Saddam about the uncompromising position of the U.S." However, and this too was quite typical, Bush immediately added, "If a positive signal should come from Saddam, it will be heard by us."

The two-hour meeting ended with President Bush saying he thought he had learned many interesting things from us. There was something new in a number of ideas that had been presented. But he noted that he had to consult with his advisers.

"Do you plan to stay on in Washington?" he asked.

I said I was ready to stay over if there was a need for it.

"I'll give you an answer in about two or three hours," Bush replied, and warmly said goodbye.

Forty-five minutes later, during lunch, Gates told me, "The President has asked me to inform you that you can decide for yourself what time you want to leave." I understood this to mean that there would be no continuation of the talks.

-- Meeting with Mrs. Thatcher

Shortly before I left Washington, President Gorbachev called to say I should stop in London to see Margaret Thatcher. The Prime Minister received us at her country residence, Chequers. She listened attentively to the information I presented her, without interrupting. But then, for a good hour, she allowed no one to interrupt her monologue, in which she outlined in a most condensed way a position that was gaining greater momentum: not to limit things to a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait but to inflict a devastating blow at Iraq, "to break the back" of Saddam and destroy the entire military, and perhaps industrial, potential of that country.

Mrs. Thatcher did not mince any words. No one should interfere with this objective, she declared. Saddam should not have even the shadow of a doubt that the world community would step back. It would achieve its objectives. No one should even try to ward off the blow against the Saddam regime.

"So you see no other option but war?" I managed to get in with difficulty.

"No," Thatcher replied.

"When will the military action start?" I asked.

"This I cannot tell you, since the military action should come as a surprise to Iraq," she replied.

The talk with Mrs. Thatcher had already gone beyond the two hours allotted. Sensing that it was becoming more abrasive, I thought I should wind it up. "I found this conversation with you useful," I told her. "Your stand is now clear to me. I do hope that this conversation was of some use to you too."

Then, all of a sudden, the Iron Lady was again the kind and polite hostess.

"Let's change the atmosphere," she said. "We'll go to the library and forget about business." It seemed to me that Mrs. Thatcher was pleased that I followed her example and preferred whiskey.

When I arrived back in Moscow, I reported the results of the trip to Gorbachev. My main conclusion: the barometer of the situation was clearly & pointing to a military solution. The President instructed me to continue the mission, and I left for Cairo, Damascus, Riyadh and Baghdad on Oct. 24.

-- Meeting Saddam Again

My second session with Saddam proved just as long as the first. Saddam invited practically the entire Iraqi leadership to the first part of the meeting. All were dressed in military uniform. Saddam pointed out that there were "hawks" and "doves" among his advisers. I wouldn't rule out the possibility that Saddam had said this on purpose, to show that there was room for maneuver. But even so, I had my doubts that Saddam's words about a diversity of opinion in the Iraqi leadership reflected the true picture. Everything was decided by one man.

It seemed to me that certain changes had taken place during the three weeks that had passed since the first meeting. During our talk on Oct. 5, Saddam had emphasized that Kuwait "historically belonged" to Iraq, but this time the subject was not broached at all. Nor was he dismissive when I told him that the withdrawal of Iraqi forces must be carried out "as a first step toward any other actions." He also seemed willing to speak about the specific conditions for such a withdrawal.

Later, when we talked one-on-one, I began by saying, "You have known me for a long time, and apparently you have become convinced that I try to tell you the truth. A strike, moreover, a powerful strike, against Iraq is unavoidable if you do not announce your withdrawal from Kuwait and carry out this withdrawal in practice."

"How can I announce the withdrawal of troops if I am not informed how the question of the removal of the U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia will be resolved?" Saddam replied. "Will the U.N. sanctions against Iraq be lifted, or will they remain in force? How will my country's interest concerning an outlet to the sea be ensured? Will there be some form of linkage between the Iraqi troop pullout from Kuwait and a solution to the Palestinian problem?"

Without knowing the answers to these questions, Saddam said, he could do nothing. "This will be suicidal for me," Saddam stressed. "And it is not only a question that is of concern to me. If, without receiving answers to these questions, I announce a troop withdrawal from Kuwait, it will be Iraq that commits suicide. That is precisely why I am expecting these contacts will continue."

Therefore, although with great stress and strain, the mechanism of a political settlement could have been set in motion, at least, a little bit. I especially underscore "with great stress and strain" and "at least, a little bit." There was no reason to exaggerate the possibilities for developing this process, but at the same time, there was no reason to belittle them either.

-- Back to the U.S.

I arrived in New York City on Nov. 15, just as the U.N. Security Council was debating a resolution that would establish a deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal. In an interview in the New York Times, I proposed postponing the adoption of that resolution. The draft of such a resolution could have been meaningful if the possibility of its adoption had been hung like the Sword of Damocles over Iraq. However, it seemed to me that if such a resolution became a reality, then the field for action would be narrowed. And I was firmly convinced that psychologically, for Saddam, the adoption of such a resolution would be counterproductive.

On Nov. 29, Resolution No. 678, calling for the U.S. and its allies to "use all necessary means" to liberate Kuwait if Iraq did not withdraw by Jan. 15, was adopted.

President Gorbachev decided that we should try to set up one last meeting between American and Iraqi officials. Flying to Baghdad at the end of December, Belousov tried to talk Saddam into holding a meeting with American representatives in Geneva, when President Bush's proposal for such a session already seemed to be blocked. The meeting between Baker and Aziz was held on Jan. 9, but it produced no results.

At 2:45 a.m. on Jan. 17, I was awakened by the ringing of the telephone. Gorbachev said Bessmertnykh, Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov and KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov were on their way to the Kremlin and asked me to come too. Then he explained: Several minutes ago, the U.S. Secretary of State had called the Foreign Minister at home and informed him that military action would start in a matter of minutes. Gorbachev asked that Bush be informed urgently of his request that the attack be postponed for a time, so that one more attempt could be made to talk Iraq into announcing its readiness to remove its troops from Kuwait. Baker told Bessmertnykh that the military action had begun. Missiles and bombs were already exploding on Iraq and Kuwait.