The Prisoners: The Fruits of Interrogation

By Jesse Birnbaum

Much of the success of the coalition's war against Iraq stems from excellent intelligence from spy satellites and other high-tech gear. But much is also the result of good, old-fashioned, low-tech intelligence work: interrogating EPWs, enemy prisoners of war (POW is now a term reserved for allied troops who are captured by the Iraqis).

From the first trickle of Iraqi soldiers who deserted or were taken prisoner in the early days of the conflict to the hundreds rounded up last week, intelligence officers have amassed files of valuable information. They have learned of eroding Iraqi morale brought on by heavy bombing; of shortages of food, water and other supplies; about the disposition, strength and fighting ability of Iraqi forces; and about the nature and the quality of their weaponry.

Some of this information is collected by targeting specific types of Iraqi soldiers who are most likely to have the kind of knowledge that the allies need. U.S. Rangers and members of Britain's crack Special Air Service have made forays deep into Iraqi territory with "shopping lists" -- engineers or artillery officers, for example, who have special information about enemy plans and operations.

Soldiers captured by the British units informed the allies that before the war started, Iraq distributed substantial supplies of chemical weapons along the front lines to be held for the ground war. The British also learned that Iraqi gunners were suffering from serious maintenance problems and had great difficulty getting spare parts, and that Iraqi helicopters had randomly sown anti-personnel mines along the front to harass advancing troops.

"Collecting information from prisoners is a winnowing process," says an American officer. The U.S. rates prisoners A through C for the value of their knowledge, and 1 through 3 for their willingness to talk. About 1 in 4 of the more than 2,000 EPWs are defectors. Many braved threats of execution or reprisals against their families at home and had to thread through minefields to reach coalition forces.

Most of the Iraqi prisoners are conscripts or enlisted men of low rank, in their 20s. About 5% are low-ranking officers; the highest is an infantry lieutenant colonel. But none are from Saddam's most formidable unit, the 150,000-man Republican Guard. From interrogating these soldiers, usually through volunteer Kuwaiti interpreters, the allies have developed a richly detailed picture of the Iraqi army's condition. Items:

-- EPWs have told interrogators that their company commanders were held directly accountable for desertions and that all troops were forced to sign an oath promising not to defect. Some EPWs told of seeing fellow soldiers hanged by loyalist execution squads and left suspended as a warning to would-be runaways.

-- Many Iraqi troops are ill-trained, ill-armed and ill-prepared. Says a U.S. officer: "These guys were not in the war for the long haul. Some have had as little as six weeks' military training. Others are veterans of the Iran-Iraq war." Those, adds the officer, are particularly war-weary.

-- Troops have gone for months without hearing from their families, and most have become depressed by isolation. Some EPWs report that they were forbidden to have portable radios.

-- Soldiers complain that their commanders lied to them, saying they were three days from the Saudi border when they were only three hours away. The distance was presumably exaggerated to discourage would-be defectors from heading south.

-- Iraqi commanders have also duped their troops into thinking they would be shot by the Americans if they surrendered or defected. Intelligence officers believe that this may explain why the great majority turned themselves in to Arab coalition forces rather than U.S. units.

-- Not all EPWs feel defeated. "We find some really incorrigible hardball types," says the American officer. "We were very impressed by the tenacity of the Iraqis who fought at Khafji."

Despite the general satisfaction over the results of prisoner interrogation, U.S. officers feel hamstrung by rules laid down by their Saudi colleagues. The Saudis do not permit American intelligence teams to question Iraqis who were captured by Arab troops. Defectors, say the Saudis, are "guests" and "Arab brothers" -- and all EPWs are considered hajis, religious pilgrims to Mecca, and are to be treated accordingly.

The Saudis do their own interrogation of these "guests" and pass along worthwhile information to the allies. The Americans are allowed only to submit written questions to the Saudis for the Iraqi prisoners. But the Americans complain that the Saudis fail to ask follow-up questions and are slow in providing transcripts of their interviews.

U.S. intelligence officers say that this is only a small problem now. But it could get bigger. The Saudis have built detention camps that will house 200,000 EPWs. If a ground war goes as well as allied commanders hope, that may not be nearly enough.

With reporting by Lara Marlowe/Riyadh and Frank Melville/London