Soviet Union: Why Are These Men Smiling?

By Bruce W. Nelan

The concept of compromise, the lifeblood of Western-style democracies, has not made much headway with the Soviet Union's combative political leaders. To them the idea of settling amicably for something less than their maximum demands still smacks of irresoluteness and a lack of ideological purity. Such rigidity is the kind of shortcoming experts point to when they talk about the need for a more developed "political culture" in the U.S.S.R.

The steadily worsening national crisis has been pushing President Mikhail Gorbachev toward a choice between massive repression and a negotiated compromise with the dissident forces. Since his sharp turn toward toughness and the conservatives last year, he seemed as likely to opt for the iron fist as for the bargaining table. In a dramatic agreement last week he signaled that compromise is the course he would prefer.

On the eve of a Communist Party Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev invited the leaders of nine of the 15 Soviet republics, including Russia's maverick chief, Boris Yeltsin, to a conference at a secluded dacha in the woods outside Moscow. The six republics that are bent on immediate independence -- Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldavia, Georgia and Armenia -- were not asked.

Splashed across the front page of Pravda the next day was the text of the leaders' agreement. It was essential to "restore the constitutional order everywhere," their statement said, and they decided to begin with such remedial economic measures as abolishing the new 5% sales tax, reviewing recent price increases and indexing incomes to the cost of living. On the political front, Gorbachev and the republic presidents cited as their "top priority" the signing of a new treaty of union among themselves and the central government. Six months after that, a new Soviet constitution would be adopted and national elections held. The agreement also included a clause in which the nine leaders recognized the right of the other six republics to decide for themselves "on the question of accession to the union treaty."

The document's most immediate effect was to strengthen Gorbachev as he walked into the party plenum assembled in the Kremlin to denounce him for his failure to bring the country to order. It proved he could make progress on the crucial issue of the union treaty, even garnering Yeltsin's support. It also reminded the communist chieftains that he does not depend solely on them for his political authority.

Critiques dominated the two-day Kremlin meeting of the Central Committee. Ivan Polozkov, head of the Russian republic's Communist Party, told Gorbachev, "I cannot understand how, after taking on such a large and responsible affair as perestroika, you have let the steering wheel slip from your hands." Admiral Gennadi Khvatov, commander of the Pacific fleet, intoned the old slogan, "The fatherland is in danger." Gorbachev, tired of the harangues, stormed to the rostrum and announced he would resign.

That was a threat he had used before, but the party leaders took him seriously. They called a quick recess, then returned to announce that the Politburo was proposing that Gorbachev's resignation not be considered. The motion passed overwhelmingly, 322-13, with 14 abstentions. It seems obvious now that no matter how much steam the hard-liners let off, the party has no ready alternative to Gorbachev.

With his position newly secured, Gorbachev could begin moving on the steps outlined in his agreement with the nine republics. Critics from both the reformer and traditionalist camps are suggesting, however, that the document papered over so many key disagreements that it may be no more than a tribute to Gorbachev's political sleight of hand. In a speech to the Soviet parliament on Friday, for example, Gorbachev showed no flexibility on the secession issue. Republics that want a "divorce," he said, would have to get it through the laborious process he has insisted on all along. That involves referendums, years of negotiations on financial settlements and finally a vote by the Supreme Soviet.

If the republics hold to their chosen course, it could theoretically lead to a Soviet Union consisting of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Turkmenistan. Such a truncated U.S.S.R. would be a poorer, more Asia-oriented country with a large Muslim population. The Kremlin and the Soviet state could no longer be a fiefdom for ethnic Russians.

But even a nine-republic union may be impossible to keep together. Strikes continue to spread, and Nikolai Volkov, a leader of the coal miners' action in Siberia, says the agreement with Gorbachev is "a useless scrap of paper." No matter what the politicians agreed on last week, a large segment of the Soviet working class is still not in the mood for compromise.

With reporting by James Carney and John Kohan/Moscow