The Political Interest

By Michael Kramer

"The mutual hostility of Arabs and Jews ((has always been)) of the severest sort. Because most of their disagreements stem from differences in ideology and religion, they have never been able to settle them by peaceful arbitration."

Whatever else may have changed about James Baker's world view since he wrote those sentences in his Princeton thesis 40 years ago, the Secretary of State's underlying pessimism about the prospects for peace in the Middle East has remained constant. As the most political of diplomats, Baker shares Irving Kristol's observation: "Those whom the Gods would destroy they first tempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict." So why has Baker now joined a long line of U.S. leaders who have attempted to do just that?

"Well," says a senior Administration official, "we promised to try. We didn't exactly link dealing with Saddam to a serious attempt to waddle around in this mess afterward, but that was clearly the President's message to the Arabs, and we are determined to keep our word. None of the toing and froing may go anywhere, which is obviously where you'd have to put your money if you cared to bet, but history shows that whenever a Middle East peace process is at least perceived to be ongoing, the chances for war recede."

All of that is fine, and undoubtedly true, but there's another reason for Baker's frenetic shuttling -- the securing of George Bush's re-election in 1992. Many American Jews harbor an inchoate but visceral belief that while Ronald Reagan and George Shultz were seen as instinctive friends of Israel, Bush and Baker are at best neutral toward the Jewish state. "We've reinforced that perception with a series of statements viewed as unfairly squeezing Israel," concedes a State Department official, "but if we can generate even a little progress -- or just the appearance of progress -- the hostility should fade."

Even a minor Middle East peace conference will help ease the suspicions about Bush and Baker. "Never mind a full-blown Arab-Israeli sit-down," says a White House aide. "If the Israelis and some West Bank Palestinians can be brought to the table to discuss anything at all, we can then say that we advanced the state of play with respect to where our predecessors left it -- and that should help us domestically."

Toward that goal, Baker will cajole and maneuver -- but serious pressure on Israel is unlikely. Baker truly believes that the parties themselves have to want peace if anything is to change. A flawed compromise (which in the current context means a solution that results from superpower arm-twisting), Baker wrote in his senior paper, "would alienate both parties and would, in the long run, be worse than adopting either's . . . all-out solutions." So while the Administration considered telling the Israelis that aid would be frozen unless they stopped building settlements on the occupied West Bank, few top officials advocate such a hardball move anymore. "Even if we tried that," says a Bush adviser, "Congress would kill us. They're up for re-election in '92 too."

What if nothing moves on the peace front, and American Jews conclude that Bush has tilted too far toward the Arabs in his attempt to jump-start the process? Then the nation will hear some words in a 1992 campaign speech designed to mitigate the political fallout. As already conceived in draft form, Bush's message will run something like this: "We proved in Kuwait that we will shed blood to preserve a nation's integrity. We will do the same for Israel if we have to. Can you really be sure than an untested Democratic President would do the same?" A thin reed, perhaps, but probably enough to stem a wholesale defection of Jewish voters.