The White House: Let's Stay in Touch

By MICHAEL DUFFY/KENNEBUNKPORT

George Bush realized he might be inadvertently backing the wrong horse in the Soviet power struggle when the text of a one-page letter from Boris Yeltsin reached him as he flew from Maine to Washington aboard Air Force One. Bravely resisting the coup against long odds, Yeltsin implored Bush to bring "the attention of the world and the United Nations" to bear on Moscow and "demand the restoration" of President Mikhail Gorbachev. Yeltsin added what for Bush are magic words, asking for "operational contacts." Translation: "Give me a call."

Yeltsin penned his plea after Bush had delivered his first tentative remarks about the intentions of the coup plotters Monday morning. Bush had carefully -- and, it later seemed, prophetically -- suggested that the putsch might fizzle. "Coups can fail," said Bush. "They can take over at first, and then they run up against the will of the people."

But if Bush had left one light on for the people, he had left another light on for their new masters. Because previous Soviet crackdowns had rarely failed, he was reluctant to bet against, much less condemn, the junta. Bush also needed to maintain civil relations in order to do business with a new regime later on. Moreover, American officials couldn't be sure that Gorbachev really wasn't sick.

Bush's unshakable faith in the power of personal diplomacy dictated conciliation. Like his tepid initial responses to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Tiananmen Square massacre, the President's first instincts stemmed not so much from what he insists are guiding "principles" as from a deep fear of change and a desire to do business with a single and authoritative head of state. Bush has often said in the past, "The enemy is instability."

Perhaps because he wasn't sure with whom he might next deal, Bush sounded a hopeful note that morning about Gennadi Yanayev, Gorbachev's handpicked Vice President and the coup's titular leader. Yanayev, as it happened, had joined Bush as a guest on board Air Force One when the President flew from Moscow to Kiev during his summit trip just 18 days earlier. "My gut instinct," Bush said, "was that he has a certain commitment to reform." Bush also took care to describe the coup as "extraconstitutional," fearing that "unconstitutional" was too strong and might offend the plotters.

Hearing of Bush's remarks from his command center in the Russian Parliament Building, Yeltsin ordered his foreign minister to deliver a letter for Bush to the top U.S. diplomat in Moscow. Deputy chief of mission Jim Collins picked up the missive himself and cabled it to Washington. From there, Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Adviser, relayed it to Brent Scowcroft, who read it aboard Air Force One and informed Bush of its contents.

The White House immediately began to retreat from Bush's earlier ambivalent remarks and voice support for Yeltsin. Scowcroft spoke with reporters in midair, criticizing Yanayev and describing the coup as "quite negative." After arriving at the White House, Bush sat in on a meeting of the deputies committee, a group of senior officials who were monitoring the situation and were by then beginning to uncover the plotters' mistakes. Several members of the group had begun to describe the coup as "half-assed."

After the session, Bush issued a second public statement. This time he fully backed Yeltsin and condemned the coup, which he now described as "unconstitutional." The statement also used language drawn verbatim from Yeltsin's letter, calling for "the reaffirmation of the post of U.S.S.R. President M.S. Gorbachev." Explained an official: "It was diplomacy through the media. This was a clear signal from us to Yeltsin." That night Bush told aides, "This may be the first time that a coup fails in the Soviet Union."

By 7:15 Tuesday morning, Bush was in his small West Wing study, tapping out an eight-point "to do" list on his personal computer. Most important was item No. 3: "Keep in touch with Boris Yeltsin." Bush put that one into effect within the hour, assuring the besieged Russian president by telephone of Washington's support. A day later, the two men spoke again, and Bush asked if it would be "helpful" to speak out again on the protesters' behalf. Yeltsin's reply: "Yes! Yes! Yes!" Later that night, Yeltsin called once more to announce that Gorbachev was safely back in Moscow and to thank Bush repeatedly for his help.

Bush didn't get through to Gorbachev until Wednesday noon, when the two men had an emotional 12-minute conversation. Careful not to gloat, Bush appeared before reporters for the second time in three hours, wearing a solemn face and explaining in a guarded voice that the coup had failed. The reason, Bush added, was that the plotters had underestimated the people's devotion to democracy. True enough, but as an Administration official admitted, "So did we, at least for the first 12 hours or so."

With reporting by Dan Goodgame/Kennebunkport