Middle East: Let the Game Begin

By LISA BEYER/JERUSALEM

By Washington's reckoning, the reply card was long overdue. But finally last week the Palestinians put their R.S.V.P. in writing. Yes, they would attend the Middle East peace conference organized by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, the first full-scale meeting between Israel and the Arabs in almost two decades. That cleared the way for a joint U.S.-Soviet announcement that Presidents Bush and Gorbachev would both attend the opening of the much anticipated parley next week in Madrid. They had already sent out formal invitations to the parties, who had all, more or less, said yes. Declared a plainly pleased Baker: "This is an important day."

Officials at the White House were even more upbeat. George Bush plans to attend the conference for one day, give an opening speech, then depart on other business -- political business in Houston, where he will kick off his re-election campaign. But with the flying trip to Madrid, he can be seen as a catalyst for the process if negotiations succeed or, if they fail, as a man who gave peace his best shot. "This is a win-win situation," says a senior official.

Baker is unlikely to stick with the talks for more than a few days. Once the dramatic photo ops are over, the substantive negotiations are likely to be long, difficult and unpredictable. The negotiators will be hampered by a lack of trust and deeply tangled issues. The talks could become a great diplomatic marathon, stretching like the SALT and START negotiations, into years and decades. That may even be the optimistic view. Pessimists suggest that, since the subject is the Middle East, the whole conference could easily blow up.

Invitations had hardly gone out before the conference planners were blindsided by an electrifying accusation of Israeli bad faith. In a book published this week (see following story), investigative reporter Seymour Hersh says he was told that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir shared U.S. nuclear secrets with the Soviet Union. According to two sources, Hersh writes, Shamir supplied Moscow with information on the targeting of American strategic missiles, which he received from Israel's spy in Washington, Jonathan Pollard.

A farfetched charge like that is almost impossible to verify. If it were true, very few officials in any government would know it, and most of those who did would consider it their duty to cover up, obfuscate and, if necessary, lie. Nevertheless, whether the tale is true or not, many people might choose to believe it. The charges and countercharges to follow could rain on the Madrid conference.

There were other things to straighten out as well. The Palestinians handed Baker a tentative list of their delegates, who will attend the conference jointly with representatives from Jordan. In a bow to Palestinian sensitivity about the implicit Israeli veto over their delegation, Baker refused to share the list with Shamir -- or so he said. But he assured the Israelis that the roster contained no names they would object to. Said an uncharacteristically trustful Shamir: "Jim Baker's word is good enough for me." The Prime Minister said it was up to his full Cabinet to decide finally whether Israel would attend the talks. But at the same time, the Soviet Union announced that it was formally restoring diplomatic ties with Israel, suspended since the 1967 war. That was a telling sign that Shamir had made it clear Israel would go.

The Palestinians' participation had been even more iffy. In the end it was their relative weakness that brought them around. For a time it had looked possible, even probable, that Arab-Israeli talks would take place without them. That raised the specter of the other Arab parties, particularly Syria, striking a separate peace with Jerusalem, as Egypt did in 1979. "That would seal the fate of the Palestinians," said Said Zeedani, director of the West Bank human-rights group al-Haq.

Instead, the Palestinians will finally sit down face-to-face with the Israelis to bargain for a measure of self-rule. In exchange, Jerusalem hopes to settle its 43-year-old conflict with an Arab world that has refused to grant it a permanent place in the region. In theory, they will negotiate on the basis of the formula first spelled out in U.N. Resolution 242: land for peace. But the Shamir government has made it clear that it has no intention of withdrawing from any of the disputed territory it claims as Eretz Yisrael.

Nevertheless, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon have also agreed to engage in this stage of bilateral talks with the Israelis, which will start no more than four days after the formal opening session. Ten days later, a third phase of negotiation will begin. The Gulf Cooperation Council, representing states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, is expected to join in organizing broader regional talks to resolve questions like water rights, disarmament and protection of the environment. Only Syria has refused to participate at the regional level.

The Palestinians have much to gain from this historic negotiation. Their aims are more realistic than ever before: gone is the dream of regaining all of mandatory Palestine and of establishing a state overnight. The Palestinians know they must pursue their aspiration of a smaller homeland step-by-step through negotiations. Still, they seem ill-prepared, both technically and psychologically, for the laborious horse-trading needed to profit from this opportunity.

The Palestinians, unlike the other parties to the talks, lack the resources of a foreign ministry and an intelligence service, essential in devising negotiating positions and in anticipating the reactions and initiatives of other parties. Palestinian activists say a number of committees have been formed to begin collecting material and forming ideas. Still, concedes Ziad Abu Zayyad, editor of the Palestinian newspaper Gesher and a possible conference delegate, "we are not prepared enough."

Nor is Washington much further along. The thesis underlying Baker's dogged efforts in the region was that convening the conference in itself would alter the parties' attitudes about what they might be able to accomplish. The small circle of Baker aides involved in the conference has been too occupied getting the parties to the table to plan what happens once they arrive. There is also the question of U.S. representation: with Bush and Baker leaving town so quickly, who will take over as the principal American delegate, to move along the complex array of bilateral and multilateral talks? One name being mentioned is Richard Armitage, who recently served as chief negotiator on the Philippine bases, but Washington has not decided yet.

The Palestinians' disarray is not entirely their own doing. At Israel's insistence, only residents of the territories who are not connected with the Palestine Liberation Organization will formally participate in negotiations. However, their moves are determined by the P.L.O., whose leadership is scattered outside the occupied lands. P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat keeps in constant telephone contact with key Palestinians in the territories.

The troubling fact is that many of them lack faith in the outcome of the process. "If you ask the average Palestinian," says Ghassan al- Khatib, an economist and another potential delegate, "he will say this is nonsense; Israelis don't want peace, and the Americans are not serious about pressing them." Those who are not merely dismissive of the conference tend to be vehemently opposed to participation in it, and they include the followers of the Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas as well as the so-called rejectionist factions of the P.L.O.

The climate of cynicism is a handicap for the Palestinian negotiators. They lack a mandate to accept the compromises that may be necessary for reaching a settlement. If they make concessions to Israel, there is the possibility they will be labeled traitors to the Palestinian cause; at worst, they risk violence. Beneath the vibrant bougainvilleas that peep over the wall ^ surrounding Palestinian interlocutor Faisal Husseini's Jerusalem home is a warning message branding him a "surrenderist."

The vast gap between the contending positions will become evident as soon as the Israelis and Palestinians begin to haggle. While the Palestinians see autonomy, a modified form of self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as the starting point for an eventual independent state, Shamir sees it as the most Israel will ever concede. Somehow, someone someday will have to devise an ingenious bridge to bring these two profound enemies any closer. But for the first time, at least, all the inimical parties in the Middle East have said they are ready to try.

With reporting by Jamil Hamad/Jerusalem and J.F.O. McAllister/ Washingto n