"I Want to Stay the Course"

By JOHN KOHAN and STROBE TALBOTT MOSCOW Mikhail Gorbachev

It was a stunning transformation. The Mikhail Gorbachev who had appeared on Soviet television Thursday evening was a defeated man -- exhausted, disgusted, frustrated, fed up, ready to quit. Even the commentator on the relatively pro- Gorbachev state TV network described the performance as having the look and feel of a "farewell interview."

But the next afternoon it was a different man who received TIME for the magazine's third interview in five years. Gorbachev had clearly decided to use the session to counteract the widespread impression that his presidency was mortally wounded by what several of his advisers had earlier in the week called the "second coup."

Far from throwing in the towel, Gorbachev came out fighting, lambasting the leaders of Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine for their declaration of a "commonwealth" to replace the U.S.S.R. Yet in classic fashion Gorbachev managed to combine conciliation with combativeness.

Essentially he reiterated the case against the commonwealth -- then offered to help bring it about. Gorbachev still saw himself as the indispensable man, the only figure on the political stage who can avert civil war, who can keep the army under control, who can bring Slavs and Muslims together, who can prevent the hungry, angry, impatient populace from pouring into the streets and providing a pretext for another rightist coup.

There were, as a good Marxist might say, contradictions in Gorbachev's claim to leadership of a cause that represents a repudiation of him personally, a cause he continues to denigrate as not in the country's best interests. But the performance was nothing less than a tour de force. He was at his most formidable steamrolling over the gaps and rough spots in the logic of his own position.

The TIME group arrived at the Kremlin's old Council of Ministers building just as the sun was setting at 3 p.m. The white-blue-and-red Russian flag was flying over the building next door, a colorful reminder of how Russian President Boris Yeltsin's political power is impinging on Gorbachev's, including the takeover of several properties.

The Soviet leader held forth in the same cavernous office, with its blond parquet floors and off-white damask walls with teakwood trim and wainscoting, where the previous TIME interview took place, in May 1990. There was barely a trace of the bags that had been so apparent under his eyes on TV the night before. He looked rested, smiled frequently, radiated energy, frequently karate-chopped the air or formed a fist to make a point, hooked his right thumb into his chest when referring to himself and several times rattled the china coffee cups in his vehemence. At one point, when describing how "the country is worried," he thrust his hands in the air like the victim of a stickup.

While Gorbachev commented at one point that he spends more time asking questions these days than answering them, this is someone who enjoys talking much more than listening. Once again, he was the world champion of eye contact.

At the end of the 80-minute session, his guests said they had come expecting that they might witness the last interview he granted as President. Gorbachev laughed heartily at the seeming absurdity of such an idea.

Q. Our magazine comes out on Monday. Will you still be the President of the Soviet Union then?

A. On Monday? I'm sure I will.

The process now under way is getting us back on the track of creating a new union. We were moving along that track until the referendum in Ukraine created a new situation. I had argued that Ukraine, on the basis of its sovereignty, could find its own place in a new union. The leadership there had signed an economic-cooperation agreement. That was the right thing to do. ((President Leonid)) Kravchuk had also said several times that nuclear weapons should be under rigid control and a single command. Of course, all republics on whose territory nuclear weapons are located should have some say in how that control is implemented, but no one has challenged the idea that there should be a single authority. Those are two very important points, and they make it possible for us still to have some sort of political union.

I've worried all along that it would be dangerous for Ukraine to end up outside the process. My concern was that the Russian leadership would use what the Ukrainians were doing as a pretext ((to thwart Gorbachev's plan for a new union)).

The decision to separate ((the Slavic republics from the union)) was unconvincing, ill founded, badly formulated. I'm all in favor of profound reform and the redistribution of authority, but ((the Slavic leaders)) decided on separation, and that's a huge mistake. If we start tearing this country apart, it will just be more difficult for us to come to terms with one another. They think they have speeded up the process, but in reality we're in danger of getting bogged down in all sorts of wrangles.

My point is that while we've got to redistribute authority, there are dangers. It's important that we not wander off the best political course.

Q. You seem much more determined to continue in office than you did on television Thursday when you used the word resignation repeatedly.

A. If other republics come to a common understanding that they want to form a commonwealth, then I -- as someone dedicated to the principles of democracy and constitutional rule, and because of my convictions and my role as President -- will have to respect that choice.

But I want a stage-by-stage, step-by-step process that will not stimulate disintegration and chaos. That doesn't mean I've changed my position. I've given this a lot of thought and analyzed my own position quite critically. Perhaps I've overlooked something. I'm capable of self-analysis. I've always been that way. But so far I haven't heard any arguments that make me want to change my position. The political process should continue without interference and within the framework of the constitution.

It's critical that we not lose control of the situation. Therefore, I'll use my powers as President, first of all as commander in chief of the armed forces. That is why ((Russian President Boris)) Yeltsin and I have each met with the leaders of the armed forces. I told them that during this period of transition the army can be sure we'll deal with all these questions -- the creation of a new defense union, the control of strategic forces, and what to do about national armies. The armed forces should be assured that they'll be taken care of, that they constitute an important institution of the state and that they can't be the object of political manipulation.

Q. Do you still believe it's possible to save the Soviet Union as such?

A. I wish that were possible, but I have my doubts. I don't think the commonwealth is more promising than the proposed union treaty.

Look here. ((He pulls a three-page typed document from a pink folder with a red tag saying URGENT.)) It's a report on the supreme soviet of Ukraine discussing the Minsk agreement; they ratified it without discussion, then added several amendments attaching conditions to the guarantees in the original document about open borders, freedom of movement and free exchange of information. So you see what's starting to happen already?

Q. Can you guarantee that during this period of transition you will keep control over the nuclear button?

. A. Absolutely, absolutely. Everything will remain as it has always been. Any alarming speculation, here or abroad, about who will have his finger on the button is groundless.

Q. But what about the notion, raised in Brest, of joint command?

A. We'll deal with that in due course. I can guarantee that everything will turn out all right. I talked with Yeltsin today, and he said to me, "Mikhail Sergeyevich, as far as I am concerned, there will be no actions on my part that will lead to confusion in the armed forces."

But the more immediate question is this: Kravchuk has named himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces deployed in the ((Ukrainian)) republic. However, he left out strategic ((nuclear)) forces. I put in a call to him on my secret line and said, "Do you know what you're doing? You're undermining the whole process."

Kravchuk told me, "I assure you, nothing will change with regard to strategic forces." I told him, "You should announce publicly that until a new defense treaty is signed, there will be no hasty decisions regarding the armed forces, and that the military will stay under a single command and under my control. Don't go introducing uncertainty into these matters! The whole world is watching. Don't confuse people!"

Kravchuk and I agreed that everything will be decided mutually and in stages. I've just sent Defense Minister Yevgeni Shaposhnikov to Kiev to work out procedures for the transition. In fact, nothing has changed so far as the armed forces are concerned. You Americans have nothing to worry about.

Q. We've heard many terms: union, confederation, commonwealth. You talk about a "soft" union. What do you mean?

A. You may have noticed that these days I'm more often asking my colleagues questions than I am providing my own answers. It is a touchy situation. I don't want to appear to be imposing anything on them. There's this false impression around that Gorbachev is trying to revive the old center and the old structures. But in fact those things don't exist anymore.

I had some questions for Yeltsin when he came to see me on Monday. "It's not clear to me what kind of commonwealth you're setting up," I said. "Both politically and legally, it's just a concept, a sketch, inviting all sorts of doubts and questions."

Nonetheless, I tried to make it clear to my comrades from the outset that there were some positive aspects to the Minsk agreement. If you compare the economic part of the union treaty with the agreement, you'll see they're identical.

At the same time, I thought I should also point out the negatives. Those three republics have no right to declare the Soviet Union nonexistent. What do they mean, there's no such country as the U.S.S.R., not even as an object of international law? If there are no laws governing the union as a whole, then who controls the army? The borders of our state have also been established by union law. The same with our territorial waters and airspace, not to mention our relations with foreign countries.

What kind of democrats are these? How can they even call themselves democrats? What about our shared commitment to develop a state governed by law? I said all this to them, and it sobered them up a bit.

They tell me that back in '37, a troika ((a three-man kangaroo court common during the purges of the Stalinist terror)) could decide a person's fate. And now a troika is deciding the fate of entire nations!

Q. The authors of the Minsk agreement have interpreted some statements from Washington as support for their position. What is your view?

A. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker are the two most important people for me on the American side. On the whole, I have always considered their policy to be constructive and supportive. They consider the process taking place in this country as our internal affair.

But the U.S. took some steps recently, particularly on the eve of the referendum in Ukraine, that, I must say, were not well thought out. They were regarded by some here as attempts to stimulate separatism in Ukraine. I told the President this when we talked on the telephone.

I wish that all our partners would adopt a balanced, patient approach in their relations with us, especially now. Mr. Baker was overly hasty in saying, "The Soviet Union no longer exists." Things are in flux here. While we're still trying to figure things out, the U.S. seems to know everything already! I don't think that's loyalty, particularly toward those of us who favor partnership and full-fledged cooperation. It is in our common interest that this process should end successfully without any surprises.

Q. You still enjoy popularity and prestige abroad. Does this help in your talks with leaders of the republics?

A. We deal with each other as partners, not like gladiators stepping into the arena. I am even tempered and have a reserve of constructive ideas, which is by no means exhausted.

Yesterday I sent a message to the parliaments of Russia and Belorussia informing them they had made a mistake in deciding to recall their deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. I said, "If you continue to act like that, you'll get a reputation for doing things in secret and sidestepping the constitutional bodies of the country. If that happens, the rest of the world is going to wonder what kind of people it is dealing with. You'll be nothing but a bunch of bandit reformers. Who will respect you if you can't respect your own constitution?"

Q. What if they all just ignore you?

A. They pay attention. In fact, we've been talking for days. I can't let myself worry about being insulted. We're trying to meet each other halfway. We've got to really think this through and not improvise. I'll use all my political and legal authority to enrich this process -- even though it's a process I don't recognize.

By interacting with my colleagues, I'll try to let them know what my position is and help them to come together and reach agreements. But I don't want to be like the guest of honor at a banquet. I don't see that as my role. What I want to do is participate in formulating the framework of the commonwealth and giving it substance.

The ideas in the union treaty and the commonwealth agreement are coming together. Many parts of the union treaty will be used: the big difference is that this will be a commonwealth of states and not a single state.

I thought, and still think, that a softer union, with some of the institutions I was proposing, would be a better way. But unfortunately we've already shattered the links among the republics, and the national economy is collapsing. An amorphous commonwealth won't bring about the kind of cooperation we need, which is why I think it's a mistaken concept. But I want to make it a half-mistake rather than a full mistake.

Q. What is your relationship with Yeltsin really like?

A. We've parted company over basic concepts. I'm for the preservation of the union as a country. I'm against what I've described as the pie being sliced up and served with tea. ((Gorbachev doodles on a pad; what emerges is a picture of a pie with crisscross lines through it.)) Who has the right to cut this country into pieces?

If the process leads to the establishment of a commonwealth, I'll accept it as a reality. Even though I don't share their concept of what's required, I wish them success. But I don't want this question to be decided on the streets, and I'll use my authority to see to it that the process goes forward normally and constitutionally.

At the same time, I am still firmly convinced we are making a mistake. I'd rather be proved triply wrong. But I want to stay the course. If the process gets out of hand, then I'll have buried everything to which I've devoted the best years of my life.

Q. Last night you were obviously furious with Yeltsin.

A. Look at the way Yeltsin behaved. We handled the whole union-treaty process together, sent it to the republics and suddenly Yeltsin comes up with a different approach in Brest. I cannot accept this. He didn't even call me. I found out that he had talked with George Bush and not to me. There was no need to draw Bush into this. It's a question of Yeltsin's moral standards. I cannot approve or justify this style of behavior. It's inadmissible.

Q. Then what basis do you have for a partnership with Yeltsin?

A. There are higher interests that should unite us. Gorbachev and Yeltsin simply cannot get away from that.

Q. Does Yeltsin agree about these higher interests?

A. Unquestionably. On a human level there are no obstacles in the way of having a dialogue with him. We have drifted apart on this conceptual question of a commonwealth.

Who knows? Maybe I am wrong. But I am firmly convinced that I am right.That shouldn't stop us from cooperating, as far as I am concerned. I hope he feels the same way.

Q. How can the West help the process of reform?

A. We need your help now. Immediately. Stop hesitating or we will all have to pay a greater price in the end. You should promote reform in the commonwealth and, first of all, in Russia. They need urgent help in the form of hard currency to provide consumer goods for the market and speed up the move toward a convertible ruble. They want to move faster, but they cannot do so without a stabilizing fund of several billion dollars. If you have given aid to Poland and Hungary, Russia certainly deserves it.

Q. Can help from the West really change the situation of people waiting out there in lines?

A. You are right. This is the result of the enormous mass of money in circulation and an imbalance between supply and demand. Those who have money can afford to buy expensive sausage. Those who don't must wait in line for goods sold at state-controlled prices. But prices will have to be fixed for certain goods, so that poorer people can afford them.

Q. Won't the republics' bureaucracies simply take the place of the old union bureaucracy?

A. The republics were fervent fighters, wanting to destroy the center and take over its functions. But as soon as they succeeded, the reform process abruptly stopped.

Q. Is there a danger of another coup?

A. It is our responsibility to see that this doesn't happen. I think a military coup is out of the question. Neither I nor Yeltsin nor the democrats would resort to this. It is just not acceptable.

But there may have to be firmness and tough enforcement of law and discipline. A strengthening of executive power -- not a dictatorship -- is necessary during this transitional period. The conservatives and reactionaries, after their defeat, are gathering strength and hoping to take advantage of the country's difficulties. There is a lot of discontent, which can be channeled in a certain direction. But they will be unable to get the army to rise up in a putsch.

If we have achieved anything both inside this country and in the world at large, it was only when we used political means. That is not to rule out emergency measures in emergency situations, particularly when there is a threat to the security of the country. Where might the biggest threat come from? If the market situation deteriorates even further, if factories are shut down, then it will lead to further decline and will force people out into the streets with political demands.

However, whenever people take to the streets, immediately all kinds of political manipulators and adventurists will take advantage of the situation for their own ends. Our most pressing task is to prevent this, no matter what party anyone belongs to. That's why we should direct aid to those areas where the tension is greatest: Moscow, Leningrad and the Urals.

Q. Can you name those who might take advantage of the situation?

A. I think they are from the old structures where conservative elements were concentrated. They were at various levels of the party apparatus, in the administrative bureaucracy and in the military-industrial complex.

Q. What about the KGB ?

A. I wouldn't worry about them. The intelligence service has been split ((into foreign and domestic branches)) so that it operates as a normal agency in any civilized state. The border guards have been taken out of the structure. So have communication facilities. KGB chief Vadim Bakatin heads the counterintelligence service, but its functions are entirely different now. Perhaps there are individuals there who could cause trouble, but not the organization as such.

Q. President Bush does not want to have to choose between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. How can he avoid this?

A. I think he should make his position very clear. Life has brought to the forefront a new generation of politicians. There is a danger that at a crucial time of change, when our -- and your -- destinies are being decided, some politicians are just entering the world of big-time politics. I have encouraged them to travel abroad. I wanted our partners to size up these new politicians. Maybe they did not see this as a tactical move by Gorbachev. They thought that since Gorbachev was sending them around, it meant he, himself, was finished and they should now deal with them -- and they made a wrong choice.

These new politicians will have to shoulder responsibilities, but they need seasoning. They may find it difficult to work with Gorbachev, who has already been through a great deal and has been tested and steeled by experience. Many of these new politicians are still populists. They have not shown themselves to be creative people. They need to prove themselves. They have to learn to adapt to things, rather than throw tantrums.

What are personal ambitions worth, if they interfere and slow down your chosen course? They're now accusing Gorbachev of slowing down, of applying the brakes to the creation of this new association of states. But I'm going to stay the course. Despite my ability to be flexible, I'm not going to give up my principles. There's a line I will not cross. I'm not going to swing back and forth like a pendulum.

Q. We came in here today thinking this might be the last interview with Gorbachev as President, but from the way you talk, it doesn't sound like that.

A. As far as my work is concerned, the main purpose of my life has already been fulfilled. I feel at peace with myself. I've lived through such experiences that I feel absolutely free. At the same time, I feel that the capital I've accumulated should be fully used for the freedom of my country and international relations. And I feel strong enough to go on.