The Other Player

By J.F.O. MCALLISTER WASHINGTON

Seventeen months after defeating Saddam Hussein in battle, George Bush now finds his future intertwined with that of the Iraqi dictator. Both men are fighting for their political survival. And each realizes that his fate depends partly on how well he can outmaneuver the other.

As a distant enemy, Saddam loves Bush. By keeping U.N. inspectors in search of weapons documents out of the Agriculture Ministry for 18 days, then allowing them inside only after insisting that no Americans could be on the team, Saddam was able to portray himself as a leader on the comeback trail, tenacious and triumphant even against a superpower foe. Senior U.S. and British officials believe that one reason Saddam provoked the showdown was to assert his authority after uncovering a coup plot two months ago that resulted in 200 executions. If Saddam can embarrass Bush and contribute to a Republican defeat in November, the Iraqi President will exact delicious revenge and score another propaganda coup to dishearten potential rivals at home.

And Saddam has his uses for Bush. The U.S. President tried to drum up political support during the 1990 midterm elections by demonizing Saddam as "worse than Hitler," and has sought to take advantage of the latest confrontation. During the Agriculture Ministry dispute, the White House released photos of midnight strategy sessions held by the President and his advisers, thus reminding voters whose steady hand steers the ship of state.

Further face-offs seem inevitable. Iraq will continue to try to undermine the U.N. sanctions that hobble its economy; the U.S. and its allies will insist that Iraq bow to international law. In such a charged atmosphere, war by miscalculation cannot be ruled out. Nor can war by design. Some Clinton aides grimly await their "October surprise" -- a confrontation with Saddam that could rally the country around Bush and give him a boost at the polls on Election Day.

But open hostilities, even limited to allied air strikes, would be perilous for both leaders. Saddam could not be sure his luck would hold again against Kurds, Shi'ites and his own disgruntled generals -- not to mention U.S. smart bombs. Bush faces a more complex set of inhibitions. Saddam has been playing a brilliant game of "cheat and retreat," chipping away at the sanctions without driving the allies to retaliation. He is not likely to hand Bush the kind of flagrant breach that would spur a unanimous vote for war among U.S. allies. Washington is prepared to go it alone, says a senior Bush adviser, but "we've gone to a lot of effort to construct a world where we could get the civilized community to agree on moves to deal with outlaws. To the extent we do things unilaterally, we destroy that which we're trying to build."

Attacking Iraq could also be messy. Bush would prefer to use unmanned Tomahawk cruise missiles. But he would probably have to send in aircraft as well, and U.S. pilots could be killed or taken prisoner. Saddam could retaliate with the several hundred Scuds he is believed to possess, attacking Israel in the hope that it would strike back and thus strain Washington's ties to Arab allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

According to Bush's campaign strategists, even a victory over Iraq would probably lose votes by underscoring the President's devotion to foreign policy at the expense of the pocketbook issues that matter most this year. Renewed Persian Gulf fighting, says a campaign official, promises to be "a lose-lose proposition for us. It could turn out badly, and we'd look incompetent. And even if it turned out well, a lot of people might think our priorities are misplaced."

Most Saddam watchers believe that he does not want to risk a suicidal death grip with Bush. Saddam's leadership since Desert Storm has been a case study in guile, ruthlessness and careful timing. The clash over the Agriculture Ministry is the fifth time the allies have had to cock their guns to ensure compliance with U.N. sanctions; each time in the past Saddam backed down. "He is trying to nickel-and-dime us until he can erode the sanctions and regain his sovereignty," says Phebe Marr of the National Defense University in Washington.

But his maneuvering room is shrinking. The allies are determined now to rein him in lest the U.N. lose credibility and Saddam be tempted by further adventures. They plan to insist that Americans serve on future inspection teams, to spotlight every Iraqi evasion of U.N. resolutions, and to boost aid to Kurds and exiled opponents of Saddam. This week the Security Council is expected to take up a resolution permitting military strikes unless Baghdad stops attacking Shi'ites in the south. The strategy, says a U.S. diplomat, is to "keep Saddam in his box."

Bush may not seek a fight, but neither is he likely to run from one. If Saddam continues to flout the sanctions, Bush might send in the bombers and electoral consequences be damned. In foreign affairs, unlike domestic policy, Bush is not scared of going against public opinion. He did so repeatedly in the Gulf War, and in the end the public followed his lead. In this dangerous dance, Saddam should not count on Bush's taking the expedient way out.

With reporting by Dan Goodgame and Bruce van Voorst/Washington and William Mader/London