Boxing In Saddam

By Jill Smolowe

* Every time George Bush conjures up the triumph of Desert Storm, a nasty fact bedevils him: the tyrant still holds vicious sway in Baghdad. There's no question the President would like to show Saddam that there are limits to his misbehavior, and last week he looked like he was about to teach him that lesson. First came a New York Times story that claimed Bush planned to provoke a confrontation over weapons inspections, a confrontation exquisitely timed to take place while the Republicans met in Houston. The idea was for a U.N. team in Baghdad to show up at a military ministry and demand entry; if Saddam balked, the allies would fire cruise missiles at selected targets. But the U.N. team, perhaps embarrassed by the publicity or unwilling to look like a U.S. pawn, quietly wrapped up business, pronounced its mission a success and left.

Bush and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney furiously denied the Times story and the implication that the President would attack Saddam to give himself a boost in the polls. But the two men were being disingenuous in their categorical dismissal of the Times report, since there was a secret scheme to attack Saddam if the U.N. team's mission had ended in failure. A few days later, the allies announced plans to carve out a security zone in southern Iraq, home of a persistent Shi'ite insurgency, that would be off limits to Saddam's combat aircraft. "We are not doing this for no good reason," British Prime Minister John Major explained. "It's happening because there is clear evidence now of the systematic murder, genocide, of the Shi'ites."

The plight of the Shi'ites is serious, but the note of selfless compassion did not quite ring true. Just 17 months ago, when Saddam was ruthlessly crushing their rebellion in the south, Western leaders stood by and did nothing. At the time, they argued plausibly if heartlessly that an allied intervention risked both a military quagmire and an unstable partition of Iraq that could extend Iran's influence in the region. Neither prospect has disappeared. With Bush in Houston trying to reinvigorate his political fortunes, it was impossible to escape cynical questions about what was for real -- and what was for political effect. No more convincing was the sudden European eagerness to provide air protection to Iraqi Muslims solely on humanitarian grounds; Europeans have not yet made a similar commitment to the Slavic Muslims in neighboring Bosnia.

Why the sharp turnaround, and why now? It appears the West's steeliness is % more reactive than provocative. For months, Western patience with Iraq has been wearing thin. Since January, Saddam has tweaked his enemies time and again, counting on Bush, Major and French President Francois Mitterrand to be too distracted by domestic issues to respond. "Saddam concluded that with all its problems, the West lacked the stomach to go to war with him again," says a senior British diplomat. "He saw that as an excellent opportunity to push his luck."

And push he did. Early in the year, he deployed 15 divisions along the internal border with the Kurdish-held north. More recently he reportedly stepped up attacks on the Shi'ite south, draining wells and defoliating the marshlands to target rebel enclaves better. Saddam also thumbed his nose at the international community, impeding the work of U.N. inspection teams, blocking aid convoys and attacking U.N. guards.

Then came the standoff last month at the Agriculture Ministry when the Iraqi leader refused to let a U.N. team through the doors. According to Pentagon officials, infuriated allies were on the brink of launching strikes against military targets around Baghdad. At the last moment Saddam backed down, but the victory proved hollow when the U.N. allowed him to dictate who could enter the ministry. Soon after, British diplomats say, allied leaders determined that whatever the next provocation, they would issue an ultimatum, then strike if Saddam did not comply.

Plan A called for the next U.N. inspection team to enter an off-limits Iraqi ministry. Anticipating Saddam's refusal, a special U.S. Air Force air-control group was dispatched to Saudi Arabia to guide the expected aerial attacks. When press leaks last week forced the mission to abort, the mounting atrocities in the south came into focus as an attractive alternative. Plan B calls for establishing the "no-fly zone" over the Shi'ite marshes. U.S. officials say an ultimatum will be issued this week giving Saddam just 24 hours to clear the southern airspace. The stated purpose is to insure unimpeded reconnaissance missions, but if Saddam dares to field his air force, said National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, "then we will take appropriate countermeasures."

The political objectives are less clear. Is this just another shot at weakening Saddam, or do the allies hope it might provoke a coup? Given the talk of genocide, does the mission imply a long-term commitment to insure the safety of Shi'ites? In the wake of Desert Storm, the West put a premium on keeping Iraq intact for fear of sparking destabilizing Kurdish and Shi'ite rebellions. Today Western leaders are willing to take a calculated risk with Iraq's integrity, as long as Saddam is put in his place.

With reporting by William Mader/London and Bruce van Voorst/Washington