Who Can Tell What Washington Wants?

By J.F.O. McAllister/Washington

What a mess in Washington too. From the outset, Bill Clinton's Bosnia policy has been equal parts wishful thinking, domestic politics and bluff; now it has virtually disintegrated under the pressure of the Bosnian Serbs and quarreling presidential advisers. The Serb triumph at Bihac has brought home the extent of Washington's failure and opened a bitter debate about what to do next. "Our policy is in complete disarray," admits a senior official. The debacle on the battlefield left the White House, senior Administration officials and a leading legislator separately enunciating contradictory positions.

Even before Secretary of State Warren Christopher traveled to Brussels to reiterate U.S. commitment to the Contact Group plan -- which would give 51% of Bosnia's territory to a federation of Bosnia's Croats and Muslims and 49% to the Bosnian Serbs -- the Pentagon was urging Clinton to cut his losses and compromise with the Serbs. Aides to Secretary of Defense William Perry warned him that NATO was being torn apart over Bosnia, and the Administration's demands for air strikes on Bihac had only deepened the rift. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that no military threats from NATO would bring the Serbs to a political settlement. According to a position paper classified secret, prepared for Perry and obtained by TIME, "we should recognize that nothing about Bosnia is worth a serious split with our NATO allies . . . We are at the point where we risk losing not only Bosnia but ((also)) NATO." An Administration official who read an intelligence report based on electronic eavesdropping said the document had advised that Paris might be purposely inflaming tensions over Bosnia to drive a wedge between Britain and the U.S. France, according to the intelligence analysis, would like to see NATO broken up and replaced by a European security alliance.

All this led Perry to arrive at the White House Monday with a position paper advocating an "illusion-free Bosnia policy" that would "stop advancing proposals we know the allies will . . . reject." Among its directives: tell the Bosnian government "that they will have to accept less" territory than the 51% awarded them by the Contact Group; drop any thought of lifting the arms embargo; and accept a confederation of the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs and Belgrade. The Defense Secretary publicly floated the confederation idea the next morning, as newspapers trumpeted a major reversal in U.S. policy.

That provoked an uproar at the State Department and the National Security Council, both of which thought Perry had agreed to something quite different at the White House meeting. "Perry stepped in a cesspool with that confederation idea," fumed a top official. "That's a code word for annexation. Our policy is to uphold certain basic principles," including Bosnia's sovereignty. Christopher called in reporters to deny any change in U.S. policy. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake delivered a speech in Princeton, New Jersey, siding with State and repudiating any notion of Serb confederation, though he admitted it was "up to the parties to agree on future constitutional arrangements." In Brussels, Christopher proposed a big international conference to work out a settlement along the lines of the old Contact Group plan in a few months. "It's fair to say this policy has limited prospects of success," admits a senior official.

According to another secret memo TIME has obtained, which Perry sent Lake later in the week, Perry wants to have NATO assume complete command of any evacuation of peacekeeping troops should that become necessary. It might, if Republican Majority Leader Bob Dole's plan to lift the arms embargo unilaterally and mount aggressive NATO air strikes passes Congress. NATO could be forced to attempt a "hostile extraction" of U.N. forces, and at least 10,000 American troops would be needed. In fact NATO is already speeding up its evacuation planning, and Perry asked for authority to tell the alliance the U.S. would participate. By week's end, Clinton hadn't made up his mind -- leaving another part of his Bosnia policy drifting.

With reporting by DOUGLAS WALLER/WASHINGTON