THE GANG THAT COULDN'T EXAMINE STRAIGHT

By Elaine Shannon/Washington

The Justice Department report on the FBI lab delves deeply into fewer than two dozen cases and examines just three of the FBI's 35 specialized units, but its repercussions are enormous. By questioning the lab's credibility, the 500-page study has undermined thousands of cases that have coursed through the agency--the lab does as many as 600,000 examinations a year--especially those handled by the 10 lab workers faulted in the study. "We're going to get hundreds, if not thousands, of motions that are going to encompass every part of the lab, from latent-fingerprint comparisons to tire-tread analysis," says a ranking FBI agent.

A great deal of resources will have to be expended simply responding to defense motions, meritorious or not. Already next week there will be a motion to reopen the case of Jeffrey MacDonald, the Green Beret doctor now serving a life term in prison for killing his pregnant wife and two daughters in the infamous Fatal Vision murders in 1970. MacDonald's lawyer, Harvey Silvergate, says the motion will be based in part on affidavits of FBI agent Michael Malone, formerly a lab examiner, submitted during the lawyer's attempt to reopen the MacDonald case. According to last week's report, Malone exhibited "inexcusable" behavior in the corruption hearing filed against former judge Alcee Hastings when Malone testified to having performed a tensile-strength test that was not only beyond his expertise but was also carried out by another member of the lab. In the MacDonald case, Malone, who specialized in hair and fiber evidence, had asserted that filaments found in a hairbrush at the murder scene came not from a blond wig worn by an intruder, as MacDonald claimed, but more likely from a doll owned by one of the murdered little girls.

The Oklahoma City bombing case is the biggest of those cited by last week's report (see following story). It strongly criticizes explosives experts involved in the bombing investigation, particularly David Williams, who, according to the study, "reached conclusions that incriminated the defendants without a scientific basis," and Roger Martz, the chief of the chemistry-toxicology unit, who "improperly deviated from...protocol in his examination of some specimens." But Inspector General Michael Bromwich's study goes on to cite other cases that have the potential for coming undone in the legal system--or at least becoming embarrassing footnotes for the already red-faced bureau. Among them:

THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING Five federal cases are being prosecuted in connection with the 1993 attack. While one is set for trial this summer, four have already resulted in convictions--which are being appealed. Of these, it is the case of Mohammad Salameh and three other defendants that has come in for scrutiny. The Bromwich report castigated Williams, then a top explosives examiner, who managed the on-site investigation, saying he "began with a presumption of guilt upon which to build inferences." It excoriated him for offering his opinion that the bomb had consisted of urea nitrate, when no intact urea-nitrate crystals were found at the scene. The report stated that Williams "tailored" his testimony to fit facts determined by the investigation.

THE UNABOMBER Terry Rudolph, an explosives examiner who worked at the lab from 1979 to 1988 and is retired, did some early work on the Unabom investigation. The Bromwich report opened with severe criticism of Rudolph for his work in the case against Steve Psinakis, an American accused of smuggling explosives out of the U.S. in 1982 in an alleged attempt to overthrow the regime of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. At trial in 1989, the judge was almost openly derisive about Rudolph's methods, commenting that "even with the FBI lab, completion of all necessary processes...is an awfully good idea, and leaving things undone because it takes more than 45 seconds to do them is not one of the smarter things to do."

Rudolph helped examine six of the 14 explosive devices attributed to the Unabomber. Assessing his work on bombs delivered from November 1979 to December 1985, the Bromwich report concluded again and again that "his performance ... lacks competence" or was "unacceptable and unprofessional." Bromwich recommended that the government not rely on any of Rudolph's work in the prosecution of Unabomber suspect Theodore Kaczynski.

O.J. SIMPSON AND OTHERS Already drubbed for his work on the Oklahoma bombing, Martz was again criticized, for his handling of one murder case and his bearing in a celebrated trial. The first involved George Trepal, who was sentenced to death in 1991 for adding the poison thallium nitrate to bottles of Coca-Cola, killing one woman. Bromwich concluded that during Trepal's trial, Martz "offered an opinion stronger than his analytical results would support" and "failed to conduct certain tests that were appropriate under the circumstances, failed to document adequately his work and testified inaccurately on various points." Last week's report also faulted Martz for his testimony on blood preservatives in the first O.J. Simpson trial, saying it "ill served the FBI" and "conveyed a lack of preparation, an inadequate level of training in toxicological issues [Martz's field of expertise] and deficient knowledge about other scientific matters."