Analyzing the Bhutto vs. Musharraf Showdown

By Aryn Baker / Lahore

What on earth did she see in him? For the duration of her short-lived marriage of convenience to President Pervez Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto's friends and political rivals wondered how she, a populist democrat, could live with him, a military dictator. The mystery deepened when Musharraf declared a state of emergency and began a massive crackdown on democratic institutions--and Bhutto responded with only mild criticism, refusing to rule out a power-sharing arrangement with him. Some said her motivation was pure self-interest: she was that desperate to return to power. Others bought Bhutto's explanation that a deal with Musharraf would allow Pakistan a smooth transition to democracy. And conspiracy theorists concluded that she had agreed to join him only at the insistence of their matchmaker, the Bush Administration.

When she ended their dysfunctional dalliance on Nov. 13--Bhutto announced she would not work under Musharraf and demanded his immediate resignation--her political rivals were just as relieved as her friends. It meant that the deeply unpopular dictator would be denied his last political lifeline. "It's impossible to work with him," Bhutto told journalists by telephone. Just as important, the opposition to his increasingly autocratic rule, led primarily by lawyers and human-rights activists, would be massively strengthened by the backing of a political leader with national, grass-roots support. "Bhutto has finally come to our side," says Ahsan Iqbal, spokesman for the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz party, which is led from exile by Bhutto's longtime foe, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. "There can now be a common agenda. With complete unanimity of goals, there is no reason why we can't all come together to get rid of Musharraf."

This is not reassuring news for the Bush Administration, which continues to regard Musharraf as a vital ally in the war on terrorism. But if Washington is constrained by its ties to the dictator, Bhutto is now liberated. And she has the opportunity many politicians crave: a chance to redefine herself. Having inherited her political mantle from her father Zulfikar--sent to the gallows by a previous military ruler--she has often been labeled a child of privilege, haughty and aloof from ordinary Pakistanis. Her two stints as Prime Minister were plagued with ineptitude and accusations--which she denied--of massive graft. Indeed, she fled Pakistan eight years ago to escape corruption charges and returned only after Musharraf agreed to drop them as part of their deal. Now she can claim the leadership of a popular uprising against a dictator--and potentially wipe clean her own record.

But first she will face a wall of skepticism from those who have been at the front lines of the uprising while she has hogged headlines in the rear. In recent weeks, critics have laughed off Bhutto's halfhearted opposition to Musharraf, pointing out that while other leaders and lawyers languished behind bars, she was able to roam free, host diplomatic receptions and broadcast her press conferences on state-run TV. But when Bhutto called for protest rallies and a march from Lahore to the capital, Islamabad, she too was placed under house arrest. The final straw, she says, was when Musharraf's forces rounded up thousands of her supporters across the country in advance of the planned march. "It left my party with the conclusion that he does not really want to do business with us," she told journalists. "It made it clear that he was using us as icing on the cake to make sure no one notices the cake was poisoned." Some analysts believe she may simply have made the political calculation that Musharraf had grown too unpopular to stay in office for very long--and that by breaking away from him she could have the power without the sharing.

But the general has shown through his eight years in power that he is nothing if not tenacious. If the deal is off, so too are his gloves. Bhutto can no longer expect any special treatment from Musharraf and could find herself in the same position as other opposition politicians--in jail or in exile again. The crackdown on her Pakistan People's Party will probably intensify. Musharraf "is capable of doing anything now," says Iftikhar Gilani, a former law minister under Bhutto who also has been a member of the general's party. "He has already confronted the press, the judiciary and the lawyers. Now he will attack the political parties, and they have large followings across Pakistan. There will be chaos."

That's a disturbing scenario for the Bush Administration, which was counting on the Musharraf-Bhutto deal to keep Pakistan stable. Many in Washington worry that the general is getting progressively heavy-handed and dictatorial. "Musharraf is digging in," says Stephen Cohen, a South Asia expert and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. "He is either suicidal or totally ignorant of the situation." Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have both telephoned Musharraf and urged him to ease up. Rice is sending her deputy, John D. Negroponte, to Islamabad to try to hold the general to his promise to step down as army chief at the end of November, lift the emergency degree and hold elections in early January. Negroponte will also try to revive the Musharraf-Bhutto deal, but some in the Administration recognize that can no longer be the only option. "If it becomes more and more clear that [Musharraf] is not budging," says a Western diplomat in Islamabad, "then certainly you start thinking of alternatives."

If Bhutto won't deal, then the U.S. may turn to the Pakistani military, which receives $150 million a month in American aid. "The best way to get Musharraf out," says an Administration official close to the current discussions on Pakistan, "is to prevail on his other colleagues in the military to remove him." The most obvious successor, Vice Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kyani, is deeply loyal to Musharraf--but the Western diplomat is quick to point out that Kyani once worked with Bhutto as her military secretary and that he was involved in the early stages of negotiating her deal with his boss. Bhutto must know that she cannot return to power without the endorsement of the military, the country's most powerful and enduring institution. Pakistani Realpolitik dictates that she may have to rebound from Musharraf into a relationship with another general.

With reporting by With Reporting By Brian Bennett / Washington